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ABSTRACT
Lebanon currently enjoys a period of limited stability after seventeen years of civil
war. The war had its toll on the country's infrastructure and left most of it in rubbles. The
government is trying to initiate a reconstruction scheme and to attract loans to rebuild the
infrastructure. The objective of this thesis is to describe a public-private partnership for the
power generation sector of Lebanon's infrastructure. Such a scheme will shift the debt
burden to the private sector and allow the influx of international capital and expertise to
the country.
The first chapter briefly describes the current economy in Lebanon. The next
chapter lists all the possible public-private schemes and explains each of them The chapter
also explains the basic characteristics of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme and its
exact structure. The third chapter analyses the lessons learned from past BOT power
generation projects in developing countries and the main issues that need to be considered
for successfully completing such a project. Chapter IV is an overview of Lebanon's
electric power sector and the problems that Electricite du Liban (EDL), Lebanon's electric
power authority, is facing. The chapter forecasts the future demand for power in the
country and concludes that EDL will have difficulty meeting the future demand if it is not
assisted by the private sector. The last chapter of the thesis describes the steps that need to
be taken in order to successfully undertake a BOT project in the power generation sector
in Lebanon. The chapter will concentrate on financing, procurement, legal agreements,
government concessions and incentives, technology transfer, and marketing. The chapter
relies on information about Lebanon's socioeconomic environment and on lessons learned
from other BOT projects in developing countries. The thesis concludes that government
participation and cooperation, both before and during the project operation, is essential in
order to attract investors and ensure that the project is completed successfully.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Fred Moavenzadeh
Director, Henry L. Pierce Laboratory
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INTRODUCTION
After 17 years of civil war, Lebanon currently enjoys a period of limited stability.
Amidst its deteriorated infrastructure, the country is trying to regain its once prestigious
status in the Middle East. Previously known as the "Switzerland" of the Middle East,
Lebanon was severely set back and most of its infrastructure reduced to rubble during the
war. After the Taif agreement and hopes of future stability, foreign capital is starting to
enter the country to help implement its ambitious reconstruction plans.
This thesis will analyze the issues related to the reconstruction of the power
generation sector of Lebanon. This sector is crucial to Lebanon's growth and to the
restoration of its pre-war status as the financial center of the Middle East. The country
needs to expand its power generation capacity in order to satisfy its present and rapidly
increasing demand for power.
The electric power sector is an essential factor in the development of the Lebanese
economy. This is due to the fact that power availability is essential for growth. All
strategies for land development face the issue of the availability of power production and
distribution facilities'. Electric power is needed in other infrastructures such as
9
telecommunications and water supply. This fact makes power availability a prerequisite for
the repair and operation of those sectors.
The government faces a set of alternatives for the financing of this expansion. At
one extreme, the government can simply rely on foreign aid (and debt) for financing. On
the other hand, the government can choose another extreme and allow the full
privatization of this sector, therefore ridding itself of the financial burdens associated with
this expansion.
Reliance on foreign aid has the following disadvantages. It reduces the borrowing
power of the government and deprives it of funds that can be allocated to other priority
aid. It also keeps the management of this sector in the hands of the government
authorities, which reduces the efficiency of management, and slows the decision-making
process. Conversely, the Lebanese economy is not yet ready for full scale privatization and
the public sector is not dominant enough to regulate such a process. Also, the Lebanese
authorities will not give up control of such an indispensable sector of the infrastructure.
One viable solution for financing the power sector is to allow a public-private
partnership to undertake the needed expansion. Under such a scheme, an international
consortium would ally itself with an operations and maintenance (O&M) contractor to
build a power generation plant and operate it for a definite period of time. At the end of
that period, the project cashflows should have repaid the private sector for its investment
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and the ownership of the plant would be transferred to the Lebanese authorities. Such a
scheme is known as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement which is intended to
draw the best of the public and private sectors.
The first chapter of this thesis will briefly describe the current post-war economy
of Lebanon. This chapter will also provide the reader with a background on the issues
faced by the Lebanese government regarding the fture economic growth of the country.
The chapter will also describe the future capital markets in the country and their roles in
economic growth and project financing.
The second chapter will present the basic characteristics of a generic BOT project
and describe the legal and financial arrangements. It will also focus on the major players
involved in such a scheme and the security package needed in every BOT project.
The third chapter will describe the arrangement and results of real projects that
have taken place in other developing countries. It will give a broad overview of the
different infrastructure financing methods and will focus on the general objectives of this
type of financing. It will also describe the general issues faced in these previous projects.
Finally, the chapter ends with a real case study of the Hub River Private Power Project in
Pakistan and the lessons learned from it.
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The fourth chapter deals with the electric power sector in Lebanon. It will describe
the demand pattern of electricity in the country and forecast future demand. It will also
show the state of Lebanon's electric power authority, its generation capabilities, the
damage it incurred during the war, and the problems (financial and managerial) it is
currently facing.
The last chapter will propose a solution to the expansion of Lebanon's power
generation capacity based on a BOT project. It will describe the following aspects of such
projects in Lebanon:
* Financial analysis of the viability of the project
* Sources and arrangement of financing
* Procurement
* Construction and operation
* Power tariff structure
* Risk coverage
* Government incentives needed to promote such projects
* Technology transfer
* Marketing such projects to international lenders
Privatization has become an economic buzzword in a very short period of time.
Since its emergence ten years ago it has become a priority in the government policies of
12
many industrialized and developing countries. In the case of Lebanon, money raised
through public-private partnership to finance infrastructure efforts can alleviate the
government's budget deficit. Therefore, these savings can be channeled into social services
such as education, health and job creation. The potential benefits can be:
· Expanded capacity: Additional resources such as human resources, including
giving the country personnel and experience in order to run such projects in the
future.
· Increased efficiency: Through better management, better technology, better
services, especially greater options open to consumers and finally greater
competition.
One clear advantage in the public-private partnership is that no borrowing on the part of
the government is involved, which would shift the debt burden from the government to the
private sector, since the loans are made without government guarantee to the private
party. This scheme will attract domestic and foreign entrepreneurial capital in the form of
debt and equity, which will lead to the improvement and expansion of infrastructural
facilities vital to the economic development of the country.
One of the objectives of this thesis is to clarify all the issues involved in public-
private partnerships and to apply them to the case of Lebanon. One of the goals of the
authors is to explain the difficulties of undertaking a BOT project in Lebanon, and to
suggest solutions that might facilitate the process. The authors hope that the Lebanese
Authorities would use the thesis as a guideline for undertaking BOT projects.
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Since there are many uncertainties in the current political and economic climate in
Lebanon, the thesis will have a limited scope. There are many political factors that
influence decisions, even if they have no economic justification. Such factors are too
complicated and broad to be taken into full consideration in this thesis, and therefore the
authors will assume a relatively stable economical and political outlook for Lebanon.
Information for this thesis was gathered from diverse sources. Although Lebanon's
reconstruction is a topic that has not been extensively written about, the authors managed
to obtain a substantial amount of helpful information. Besides using the obvious sources
such as library books and previous theses, information was obtained from several
government ministries, the World Bank, international privatization consulting agencies,
Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction and some personal interviews
with government officials. Although the reliability of some of this information might be
questionable, the authors agree that it is accurate enough to serve the qualitative purposes
of this thesis.
Reference:
1. "Rebuilding The Residential Structure of Lebanon" MIT-AUB Joint Research Project
on Housing, MIT 1992.
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I. LEBANON
This section is intended to provide the reader with a background on Lebanon's
economy in 1993. The section will also describe the upcoming capital markets in Lebanon,
since this issue will be significant in financing the public-private partnership project. This
section will not deal with historical events or touch on the many aspects of Lebanon's
social environment. The war in Lebanon had many negative effects on the country and
these are too complicated to be described in this thesis. The authors wrote this chapter for
the sole purpose of depicting Lebanon's current economy, which is used as background
information for applying the power generation case to the country.
A. Economy in 1993
The seventeen years of war have severely affected Lebanon's economy. Most
industries have been critically impeded and, as a result, the country suffers many social and
economic problems. Lebanon's infrastructure was severely damaged and this was one of
the many factors that resulted in the hindrance of the economy. The Lebanese pound
plunged severely and caused the bankruptcy of many individuals and institutions. Other
economic problems include very low wages compared to the soaring consumer prices.
Lebanon remains economically disadvantaged compared to its neighbors (Appendix I
contains relevant statistics about Lebanon). Despite these developments, the economy is
slowly picking up. In 1993, economic indicators were positive: the Lebanese pound was
steady, consumer prices were not as highly inflated and foreign capital was starting to flow
into the country'.
The government is trying to boost the service industry which, traditionally.
constitutes Lebanon's comparative advantage. The government is also trying to reduce its
local debt and decrease the trade deficit (Appendix I). The budget deficit for 1993 was
42%, a high figure but favorable compared to 50% in 1992'. Due to the government's
lack of funds, the private sector's investment is encouraged, given that Lebanese Diaspora
controls large amounts of capital holdings around the world, and that Gulf Arab investors
have a shown strong interest in investing in Lebanon.
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The Council for Development and Reconstruction unveiled a $10 billion ten year
plan for economic recovery. The plan might expose Lebanon to high levels of foreign
indebtedness (34% of GDP in 1994), but is still lower than most developing counties'.
Foreign aid increased in 1993 and a substantial amount of emergency aid was promised.
The aid comes mostly from neighboring Arab countries.
Lebanon signed four economic agreements with Syria'. The first aimed at
achieving socioeconomic complimentarity and recommended freedom of transport of
goods, persons and capital. The second increased cooperation between the two countries
on health-related issues. The third facilitated transportation of vehicles between the two
countries, and the last agreement included a cooperation in agricultural policies. These
agreements will boost the economies of both countries and will help in Lebanon's
recovery.
Nineteen ninety-three was a turning point for the Lebanese economy. Even though
it is still weak, signs of recovery are finally surfacing. The economic indicators are
positive, and the following events demonstrate a promising economic future for the
country2:
* Income Tax Law was reformed; it now provides an encouraging ground for both local
and foreign investment.
* The successful floating of $650 million of shares of SOLIDERE (the real estate
company responsible for rehabilitating the Central Business District of Beirut). The
17
40% oversubscription confirmed that both Lebanese nationals and Arab investors are
willing to channel money into Lebanon. The flotation of share will also encourage the
prompt the opening of the Beirut Stock Exchange.
* The Beirut Stock Exchange is due to begin operating in October, 1994. It will be a
vehicle for promoting foreign investment in Lebanon.
* Real National Income increased by 6% (highest increase in the Middle East).
* The consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks increased from $7.9 billion to
$10.99 billion.
* $1.0 billion surplus in balance of payments account.
* Exchange rate of the Lebanese pound against the US dollar improved from LL 1838 in
December, 1992 to LL 1711 by the end of 1993.
* Capital base of commercial banks increased by more than 100%.
* Construction permits increased significantly.
The above events are some examples of the positive economic outlook at the end
of 1993. We can conclude that Lebanon's economy is weak but shows signs of recovery,
especially if the private sector contributes to that process. Some of the ways to facilitate
economic recovery are to reform the financial systems and to allow channels for both
domestic and foreign investment in the country.
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B. Future of Capital Markets in Lebanon
Lebanon is currently trying to fund its reconstruction efforts. Since the government
is finding it difficult to secure loans, other means of raising capital must be found. Capital
markets offer a valid alternative since they will attract international capital which could
partially fund Lebanon's reconstruction. Once capital markets are opened up to
international investors, many individuals and institutions interested in the high returns
offered by emerging markets will invest in Lebanon. In addition, international investors
would be more encouraged to invest in a country that has a developed capital market
rather than give loans to individuals or governments. Through the use of government
bonds, country funds or Eurobonds that are traded in both Lebanon's and other markets,
the government of Lebanon will gain the confidence of international investors and hence
their capital. Before the war, financial services contributed to over 40% of Lebanon's
GNP. Restoring these services will boost Lebanon's economy and help finance the
reconstruction.
Capital markets in Lebanon can be used as a vehicle for privatization. A stock
exchange can be used to allow the public to buy shares in the government owned
companies such as utility companies. The public's buying of shares will lessen the debt on
the government and allow the public to share the risks of projects. The government can
also borrow from the public by issuing bonds instead of having to rely on international aid.
SOLIDERE, the company rebuilding the Central Business District of Beirut, was sold as
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shares and was able to raise $1.5bn through the public's participation3 . The government
would have encountered difficulty raising this amount of money in a short period of time.
Another use of capital markets would be to help in redistributing wealth in
Lebanon. Unfortunately, the war left a large gap between the social classes and almost
wiped out the middle class. Today a small group of individuals control most of the wealth
in the country, while the rest of the population suffers from high price inflation and low
wages. Most Lebanese citizens living abroad and people of Lebanese origin have
accumulated substantial amounts of holdings and are ready to invest them in Lebanon.
Capital markets will encourage investment and allow the flow of capital into the country
to be efficient. In addition, it will allow the lower income class to share the profits of
entrepreneurial businesses. They can slowly channel their savings into stocks and bonds
and eventually participate in owning large businesses. In the absence of capital markets,
the lower income groups will not get a chance to participate in owning business since the
wealthier owners will not want to share ownership. Finally, shared ownership of
businesses will promote efficiency, since management will be supervised by shareholders
and will have to seek their interest rather than the interest of a sole owner.
There are four capital markets currently being developed in Lebanon: the foreign
exchange market, money markets, the corporate and government debt market and the
Beirut Stock Exchange4. The foreign exchange market was the largest in the region before
1974. It was not only a domestic market, but also dealt on an international basis. During
20
the war, other money market centers such as Bahrain and Cyprus replaced Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Lebanon can quickly regain its role as a regional and international foreign
exchange market in the near future.
The monetary authorities in Lebanon are in the process of developing a "Beirut
Dollar Market4." These actions recognize the dollarization of the Lebanese economy and
allow banks and institutions to clear foreign currency payments and to hold deposits in
foreign currency at the Central Bank. In the future, the Beirut Dollar Market can act as an
important circuit for both international and local funids and can direct them toward
productive activities as the market develops. It will be a contributor in generating financial
resources for the corporate sector.
The corporate government and debt market will increase the type and maturities of
securities offered by the government and extend the coverage by the public as well as
creating an active secondary market4. The government introduced a swap market, which
allows banks to substitute securities in the government debt market. In the future, banks
can engage in such activities without central bank intervention. The government will be
able to issue many types of financial instrument to the potential Lebanese, Arab and
foreign investors. These securities include reconstruction bonds, savings bonds, and longer
dated instruments. Once the government debt is liquid and international, corporate debt
can be developed. Many sectors of the infrastructure can benefit from the availability of
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medium and long-term financial resources. This will reduce the debt issued by the
Treasury and restore financial discipline to the corporations and institutions.
The Beirut Stock Exchange was active before the war. Even though it had a
relatively small capitalization, it included forty companies. Now it is dormant, since the
war imposed difficulties on the assessment of the value of companies, on communication
and on political and economic risk assessment4. The potential size of the market is large
relative to the current economic condition of Lebanon. SOLIDERE, the company
undertaking the reconstruction of the Beirut central Business District has a capitalization
of about $2.3 billion. SOLIDERE's shares will form the backbone for the revival of the
Beirut Stock Exchange. Other private companies, financial institutions and industries can
be listed on the BSE, which would raise its capitalization to over $3 billion. This figure is
reasonable for an emerging capital market, compared to other emerging markets such as
Jordan and Colombia.
The BSE should allow cross-listing of company shares from exchanges in the
region. Many neighboring countries are expected to start privatization schemes and
Lebanon could be used as a gateway to invest in these emerging markets. In the future,
Syria, Iraq and the Gulf countries have great potential but most do not have the necessary
infrastructure to sell their companies' shares. Lebanon, once it restores its status as
financial center of the Middle East, could be the first step for foreign investors who need
to access these markets. These companies could be listed in US Dollars and internationally
22
quoted. This would enable Middle Eastern companies to be listed in both their national
currency and in US dollars in the BSE4 . In the future, the role of Lebanon will be reversed:
in the past Lebanon was the financial center enabling Middle Eastern countries to channel
their money out of the Middle East to foreign markets. Tomorrow, Lebanon will enable
foreign investors to channel their money to emerging Middle Eastern markets.
23
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II. A GENERIC BOT PACKAGE
A. Introduction
In the post-World War II era, most infrastructure projects around the world were
built and financed by the government itself, or under the supervision of a government
agency.
However, several trends were developed in the seventies to find an alternative way
to finance those big projects for the following reasons:
First, the need for infrastructure continued to grow with continuous population
and economic expansion. Second, the debt crisis which was haunting Third World
countries, decreased the borrowing capacity of the developing countries in order to
finance infrastructure projects. Third, recession in the Middle East during the Eighties left
major international construction companies without big contracts, therefore facing a major
downturn in their business. Finally, throughout the Eighties, a number of govermnent and
international lending agencies found vested interest in promoting and developing the
private sector as well as privatizing the traditional public sectors. Figure 1 shows the
spectrum of policy options.
Figure 1: Spectrum of Policy Options.
Source: Reference number 7.
Spectrum of Policy Oprtions
Fully Fully
Private Joint Innovative ulPrivate Regulation PublicRegulation Development Finance
ShareI I I
Shared Ownership Services Contracting
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A new way of financing big projects was to follow the old financial arrangement of
"concessions" used in Nineteenth century France. Formerly, "concessions" were widely
used in developing infrastructure: the government conceded ownership of the land and
the right to operate it to a private company. A well known concession is the Suez Canal
in Egypt. The "concession" concept was merged with a modem financing technique of
non-recourse project financing which was perfected in the late sixties and seventies mainly
in the area of oil and gas exploration. In such a financing arrangement', a lender provides
funds for a project without a collateral and relies on the project staying solvent to recoup
its investment. In the United States and other developed countries, similar project
financing occurred in the seventies to promote infrastructure projects, such as power
plants, airports and toll roads. The result is what we now refer to as "BOT project."
The "BOT" term was first conceived by the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in
the early eighties, designating "Build-Operate-Transfer."
There are different models of BOT type projects:
* BOT Build, Operate and Transfer.
* BOO Build, Operate and Own.
* BT Build and Transfer.
* BOOT Build, Own, Operate and Transfer.
* BRT Build, Rent and Transfer.
* BOOST Build, Own, Operate, Subsidize and Transfer.
* ROO Rehabilitate, Operate and Own.
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Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer.
· LDO Lease, Develop and Operate.
** For more details on the structure of some of these models, refer to Chapter III.
Although several kinds of BOT type projects exist, some common characteristics
apply to all of them2 :
* In each approach, one or more sponsors from the private sector are authorized to create
a "project company," to build, operate, lease, or rehabilitate a public facility.
* The project company, following each approach, should follow strict government
regulations and specifications.
* In each approach, the project company should have a high debt:equity ratio , usually 8:2.
The equity financing is usually procured by the parent company, while the debt financing is
usually raised from the commercial banks or multi-national agencies.
In each approach, the project agreement should incorporate a security package.
This package should include all the probable risks that may affect the project cash flow.
Criteria for BOT type Projects:
For a project to be implemented as a BOT-type project, it has to meet two basic
criteria:
· The project is profitable as structured. Private contractors will only participate in a
project which guarantees to pay off the capital costs involved, and which provides
them with a reasonable rate of return.
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· ROT
* The project has a dependable revenue stream. This gives a comparable advantage
to BOT projects over all other project financing arrangements: In a BOT project,
revenue streams are ensured through credit enhancements while in entrepreneurial
projects, there is never any assurance whether there will be any demand for one's
product.
For example', the government will usually guarantee that a highway BOT will
always carry a certain level of traffic, or that a power plant BOT will require the utility to
buy a certain amount of the plant's electricity output.
Once these two conditional criteria are met, the project is only potentially
candidate for implementation under BOT style arrangement. To guarantee such an
implementation, the legal, economic, and political environments of the country in question
must be considered. This chapter will focus on the BOT approach of infrastructure
projects in developing countries. Thus, it will not discuss several types of privately owned
projects built with non-recourse financing in various sectors.
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B. Basic characteristics of BOT projects
Even though all BOT type projects vary according to their specific environments,
they all share a fundamental generic structure which includes the following basic
characteristics: (refer to Figure 2)
1. Host Government
The host government is by far the most powerful player in this game. In order for a
BOT project to occur, the host government should be fully committed to accept the
project and to support it. The host government's role will start by authorizing the project
through specific legislation, followed by supporting the project financially (which is an
essential ingredient for the development and implementation of a BOT project). Finally, it
remains the ultimate client or purchaser of the project. In conclusion, as for developing
countries, BOT-type projects can't be realized in a purely private sector venture, without
the direct interference of the host government or one of its agencies.
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Figure 2: BOT Project Structure.
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2. Sponsors; Project Company
The second most important player in a successful BOT project is a financially
strong, experienced and capable sponsor or group of sponsors who will form the Project
Company. The Project Company is usually a consortium including an international
engineering and construction firm, a heavy equipment supplier as well as a separate firm
responsible for operating and maintaining the facility throughout the life of the concession.
The communication within the consortium tends to be difficult at some critical phases of
the project. As a result, it is highly advisable for the project company to be formed at an
early stage in order to avoid later delays due to negotiations among the different interest
groups within the consortium, along with the multilateral lending agency, investment
bankers or host government.
An equity participation by the host government is sometimes viewed as
unnecessary since the inclusion of the host govenment among the shareholders might add
an analogous bureaucratic interference . This interference leads to the mismanagement of
the project-- the very thing which privatization wishes to avoid.
3. Financial Viability
Equity investors and potential lenders should be convinced of the financial viability
of a BOT project over its intended life; the project should have a certain source of revenue
to cover the principle and interest payments on the project debt. It is very likely that
equity investors as well as lenders show no enthusiasm about using experimental "state of
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the art" technology in the project since they are committing substantial sums of money
and are supposed to bear the risk.
4. Local Partners
It is highly recommended for project companies to have a local partner to provide
the needed logistical support during the development phase. The local partner should be a
strong, well connected, private entrepreneur, who understands well the local working
environment. Such a partner can help the project company deal with the government.
agencies, local subcontractors, and suppliers of raw material.
5. Construction Consortium
The core of the BOT project consists of a large building job. In order to assure
the lenders and the equity investors that the project will be built on time, at the cost agreed
on, the construction company as well as the heavy equipment supplier, should be of a
proven reliability, expertise, and financial strength2.
Other basic characteristics of any BOT-type project are its financing, security to
lenders, and transfer to host government. These characteristics will be thoroughly studied
later on in this chapter.
C. Financial Evaluation of BOT-type Projects
The purpose of this section is to examine the attractiveness of a project to the
private sector, and to determine if a project would be economically beneficial to the
country.
BOT projects are financially evaluated by investors using several tools. In the pre-
feasibility stage, two measurements are used: the financial internal rate of return (FIRR),
which indicates whether a project can be financed, and the economic internal rate of return
(EIRR) which indicates a project's net economic benefit to the country. From the
investors' point of view, the internal rate of return on equity (IRRe) is an adequate
indicator of the attractiveness of a project to the private sector2.
Two financial techniques are used to calculate IRR: "obtaining future net cash flow
streams and using discounting cash flow methodology to arrive at an estimate of the
present value of these net cash flow streams2."
IRR, FIRR, and EIRR are not always valid tools to examine the attractiveness of a
project. The assumption behind these financial measurements is that one can always
forecast the project's future cash flow. Unfortunately, there are many variables which
develop over the life of the project. These variables can alter the rate of return. Among
these variables, are the cost overruns, delays in construction, inflation, foreign-exchange
fluctuations and force majeure.
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D. Financing BOT-type Projects
A generic BOT project is usually financed with a combination of equity provided
by the project company, and debt provided by the lenders, which usually are commercial
banks, international financial institutions and multilateral lending agencies.
Since most BOT projects fall within the infrastructure sector of the economy, these
projects tend to have four main distinguishing financing characteristics which will dictate
the type of capital needed for financing any of these projects2:
1) "Lumpy" Most projects require irregular infusions of capital over the
construction phase. This phase may vary from three to five years according to the
size of the project.
2) High front-end costs. The BOT project will require a large initial capital
infusion.
3) Long time Horizon. The life of the project varies usually from ten to thirty
years.
4) Highly leveraged. The ratio of equity to debt seems to fall most often within
the range of 10% to 30%. Some Debt/Equity ratios for major BOT projects
undertaken are:
Navotas Power plant (Philippines): 75/25
Eurotunnel: 80/20
Hab River (Pakistan): 85/15
North-South Expressway (Malaysia): 90/10
Antrim Power Station (Northern Ireland): 82/18
Skytrain (Thailand): 80/20
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As we noticed from the above examples, the debt to equity ratio might vary
between 10 to 30%. This fluctuation is due to the impact of several issues specific to each
individual project. As a senior consultant at an international privatization group noted:" It
is possible to do projects with a 10% equity in some countries, although this low level
would require a whole web of contractual agreements for allocating the risks. But in other
parts of the world, equities have to be at least 25 to 30% of the total project cost for a
BOT project to be feasible. In the case of the Hopewell project (in the Philippines),
Hopewell's equity amounted to 24.4% of the total project cost3."
A generic financing package for a BOT project has four different sources of





Each of these sources should be examined separately.
1. Domestic Equity
Raising domestic equity in developing countries is not always an easy task.
Generally LDCs (Less developed countries) financial markets tend to be underdeveloped.
There are usually two basic reasons behind that phenomenon3 . On the supply side, there is
an insufficient number of high grade securities, due to the fact that many corporations
have been reluctant to list their stocks on the market. On the demand side, there is a
limited participation from the investors side involved in the stock market due to a lack of
knowledge of the financial tools, and a general fear of financial assets.
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An example is the case of Lebanon, where a lot of companies do not want to go
public for a variety of reasons. Families and businessmen have the tradition of retaining the
control of their companies to themselves, fearing that they would lose management control
once they go public. Apart from that reason, there is a prevailing belief among family-
owned companies to earn all the potential profit they can make, without necessarily
sharing it with outsiders. These facts are common to most LDCs.
There are four potential sources of domestic equity in LDCs that could be able to
finance BOT projects2 . Since these are the only sources available, they will tend to demand
a significantly high rate of return. These sources are:
- Local Sponsor
- Local Joint Venture Partner
- Venture Capital Funds
- Local Mutual Funds
Local Sponsor
In LDCs, over the last decades, most of all infrastructure projects have been
undertaken by government contractors and not bid out to the private contractors. Thus,
not many private contractors have the necessary experience nor the size to handle a BOT
infrastructure project on their own. They tend to ally themselves to foreign contractors
through a joint venture.
Local Joint Venture Partner
Most foreign sponsors prefer to have a local partner. The local partner will have a
better understanding of the country's regulations, and will have an easier access to the
government. The local partner can also act as a protection shield for the foreign sponsor.
In the case of political unrest, it is less likely for a government to nationalize a project
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company which is partly owned by a local. Thus, the actual presence of a local partner can
reduce the country's risk.
Venture Capital Fund
There are two known venture capital funds in LDCs. Family-owned venture funds
which, usually invest in family businesses, and are of no use to BOT projects. The second
type of fund is the institutional venture capital fund which purpose is to re-invest capital
given by their investors or shareholders. A famous example would be the Shearson-
Lehman fund which is very active in Argentina, India, and the Philippines.
Local Mutual Funds
Private placement of capital through local mutual funds is always an option in
LDCs. For example, in Lebanon, a brand new local mutual fund has been designed under
the supervision of Fidelity Investments. It seems that it attracted already a decent amount
of capital.
2. Foreign Equity
There are usually five sources of foreign equity available to finance BOT projects
in LDCs2:
- Foreign Sponsor
- Foreign Joint-Venture Partner
- Debt-Equity Swap
- Foreign Venture Capital Fund
- Private Sector Windows
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Foreign Sponsor
Since that infrastructure projects are highly specialized by nature, they usually
appeal to sponsors experienced enough in that particular field, in order for them to be
credible among lending agencies.
Foreign Joint- Venture Partner
As was mentioned before, the inclusion of a domestic sponsor would lower the
country risk associated with the project. Because of the benefits associated with having a
local partner, many of the expected BOT projects will be carried out under a foreign-local
joint-venture.
Debt-Equity Swap
Specifically with the advent of the Latin American debt crisis, new forms of
external debt reduction are beginning to gain credibility and acceptance on the
international terrain. Perhaps the most innovative financing practice used to reduce LDCs'
debt to international lenders is the "debt-equity swap".
The debt-equity swap used to purchase an SOE (State owned enterprise) would
involve the following steps4:
* A foreign company is possibly interested in acquiring a certain public enterprise, which
will be privatized in the near future.
* The national investment institution that controls the public enterprise has outstanding $
loans from international commercial banks, and wants to convert them to avoid the foreign
exchange required to pay interest on them. In turn, the banks want to get rid of the debt
for fear that the loan will never be collected.
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* As a result, the foreign company acquires the debt (in dollars) at a discount from the
international bank; the higher the level of country risk, the larger the discount.
* After it got the debt certificates, the foreign company is in a position to negotiate with
the LDC's central bank, in order to convert the certificates to local currency instruments.
The next step will consist of negotiating with the government agency which owns the
SOE, in order to use the local currency acquired to purchase all or part of the equity in the
SOE.
* The consequences of the debt-equity swap transaction will lead to the reduction of the
LDC external debt; in addition to that, the foreign investor would have acquired a
company at a low price; finally, the government agency involved in this transaction would
have successfully transferred one of its holdings to the private sector.
Several Latin American countries have experienced debt-equity swaps, but the
most experienced country by far remains Chili where legislation has been passed to
promote and regulate this activity.
Foreign Venture Capital Funds
There are several institutional venture capital funds which are potential candidates
for investing in BOT projects. The problem associated with this type of equity investment
is that the fund is very adverse to the country risk. Since each investor in this fmd is
willing to accept a different level of risk, the guidelines of the capital venture fund should
accommodate the most risk adverse of the investors.
Private Sector Windows
The International Finance Corporation of the World Bank can play a tremendous
role in a project's equity financing. Another influenceable private sector window is the
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Asian Development Bank which already assumed equity and debt investments in Asian
LDCs BOT projects.
3. Domestic Debt
There are four sources of domestic debt available to finance BOT projects:
- Commercial Banks
- Institutions
- National Development Banks
- Commercial Paper
Commercial Banzks
Commercial banks' loans are usually short-termed with a high interest rate. In this
case they will be of little use to BOT projects which require payback periods of 15 to 20
years.
Institutions
There are two types of domestic institutions which provide debt financing to BOT
projects: insurance companies and pension funds. The only obstacle in financing a BOT
project with such funds, is that they usually require a proven record of potential profits
and dividends.
National Development Banks
These national banks offer a comparable advantage in debt financing. Their loans
are long-term, usually five to fifteen years (depending on the bank, and the nature of the
project) at competitive interest rates.
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In order to gain access to these loans, the project company should convince the
Development Bank that its project meets the prequalification criteria of the sources of
finance set by the World Bank.
Commercial Paper
So far only blue chip companies were able to issue commercial paper. Therefore
financing BOT projects through commercial paper will be of a very limited scope.
4. Foreign Debt
According to the World Bank, there are three sources of foreign debt available to
finance large BOT projects:
- Foreign Commercial Banks
- Export Credit Agencies
- Private Sector Windows
Foreign Commercial Banks
Commercial Banks have been reluctant to lend LDCs with high country risk. They
have only been willing to lend to the private sector with a guarantee fiom an export credit
agency.
Export Credit Agencies
A guarantee from an export Credit Agency allows a bank to lend to a developing
country with coverage for sovereign risk. This risk is assumed by the agency for the sole
purpose of promoting its country's exports. However only projects including a high
foreign content are able to systematically address this funding source.
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Private Sector Windows
The comparable advantage of the private sector windows, as stated in an earlier
section of this chapter, is that they offer long-term loans with low interest rates. Another
advantage of having the IFC (for example) as a creditor in a project, is that it directly adds
credibility to the project, and may entice other banks to get involved in the financing
procedure. The private sector windows seldom occupy a dominant position, limiting their
intervention to 15% to 25% of the project cost.
In conclusion, it appears that the proportion between foreign currency and local
currency as well as the proportion between debt and equity are all dictated by the nature
of the project and the country involved. For example:" A power plant project, with the
need for expensive foreign source heavy equipment and perhaps a greater need for foreign
expert services will require a very large part of the investment in foreign currency. A toll
road project, on the other hand, particularly if the local economy is capable of providing
much of the steel, cement, and other materials to be used, will require much less foreign
currency financing'."
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E. The Security Package
BOT projects face several identifiable risks due to the nature of the project. These
risks might be of a political or economical nature, and might affect tremendously the
projected cash flow of the project. For this reason, financiers would not pour money in a
project for the sole fact that it has a strong projected cash flow. They have to have
assurances that these risks are carefully detected and covered through guarantees (in this
case, credit enhancements), and that each party (referring to the sponsors and the
government) will agree to inject money into the project to offset the money lost due to the
occurrence of that particular event'. The legal package that includes the contracts of what
risks are covered by who, is referred to as the security package. It is an essential
'"ingredient" of every BOT-type project.
The risks may be divided into three distinct categories, depending upon when in
the life of the project they occur. The risks are pre-commissioning risks, post-
commissioning risks, and finally project lifetime risks.
1. Pre-commissioning Period Risks
Pre-commissioning risks are the risks that may occur before that the project
becomes operational. These risks include the possibility that the project will be aborted by
the shareholders, the risks of late start-up, cost overruns and delays arising from force
majeure, damage encountered on site, and bankruptcy of shareholders and suppliers. There
is also the risk that government regulations, related to customs, procurement and
construction work force regulation will increase construction costs or provoke delays. The
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major pre-commissioning risks, however are capital cost risk and the construction delay
risk.
2. Post-commissioning Period Risks
These risks emerge once the project becomes operational. In this category, risks
are usually output shortfall due to physical damage, strikes or general operational reasons;
output shortfall due to inadequate fuel supply; inflation and operating costs above forecast
levels; and again government actions such as change in import restrictions, tax regime, or
safety and environmental legislation which effects the viability of the project. The most
significant post-commissioning risks are the operating risks, along with the technical risks
specific to the project.
3. Project Lifetime Risks
This third set of risks consists of the risks to which the project is exposed
throughout the project life. These risks include foreign exchange risk, increased interest
rates, nationalization and expropriation, and delays of the date of commissioning.
Particularly relevant in developing countries, are the currency convertibility risks, general
political risks, and finally the risk that shareholders will not fulfill their joint venture
responsibilities.
4. Risk Allocation
As seen above, the risks involved in a BOT project are numerous and diverse.
Therefore, it will be very useful for the public as well as for the private sector to allocate
these risks; the following risks are the most common ones to occur':
45
Force Majeure
This type of risk is usually not insurable at all; commercial lenders as well as export
credit agencies will normally be reluctant to take force majeure risks in a BOT context,
and will seek for the support of one or more of the parties involved. On the other hand,
equity investors may assume the force majeure risks for themselves but normally will not
be willing to protect the lenders against this risk2; they will do so(assume the risk for
themselves), if offered considerably more upside potential than 16% to 18% return. The
lenders, therefore, would require a sort of guarantee from the government, providing
them, with some coverage for uninsurable force majeure risks.
Izflation and Foreign Exchange Risks
Both lenders and equity investors to a project in a developing country will insist on
implementing a mechanism to protect themselves against inflation and foreign exchange
risks. These investors are convinced that such risks are beyond their controlling web, and
that the host government should offer a sort of protection in order to prevent the
occurrence of such events. In a typical BOT project, the potential rewards to the investors
are never great enough to compensate for taking inflation or foreign exchange risks2.
Local investors would only require protection against inflation. On the other hand,
the foreign investors would require a protection against both inflation and foreign
exchange risks. Specifically when the revenues of the project are derived in local currency
they would want assurances such as (a) currency will be legally converted into hard
currency, (b) and that sufficient hard currency will be available to permit that conversion,
(c) and finally that the conversion can be made when the investment is made2 .
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Inflation risk, according to the World Bank, is usually covered by the long term
off-take contract (in the case of a power plant), or the agreement with the host
government as to minimum revenues to be collected from the public (in the case of toll
roads or ports) will normally provide for periodic adjustments in the price of the goods or
services produced by the project based on some relevant index of local inflation. The host
government is also expected to guarantee convertibility, the availability of sufficient
foreign exchange and the exchange rate2 .
Sovereign Guarantee
Host governments who, in most cases do not guarantee the loans made to the
project company, will be expected to provide sovereign guarantees for some aspects of the
project. For example, when a government utility undertakes the long term supply of fuel
or energy to the project, the government itself is required to guarantee the utility's
performance; moreover, the basic agreement between the host government and the project
company will usually contain numerous obligations for the host government to undertake'.
Protection from Competition
The project company normally expects assurances from the host government on
protecting the BOT project against any outside competition. For instance, in the case of a
toll road, the sponsors would require assurances that no other parallel road will be built
during the life of the project.
Completion Risk
In every BOT project there is a risk that the project would not end on time, for the
price stated. This is why such projects are often supplemented by performance bonds. As a
consequence, the cost of the whole project is increased (to include a risk factor) in order
to compensate the contractor for taking such a risk.
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Performance and Operating Risks
Some warranties would be included in the security package concerning the
performance of the project. These guarantees are provided by the construction company,
as for the actual building of the facility; in addition, the operating company will guarantee
the performance of the project during the post-completion phase.
Cash Flow Risk
Commercial insurance is available in the London market to cover cash flow risk in
BOT projects. However, the cost of this insurance will become part of the overall cost of
the project. In the case of a power project, this would be reflected in the higher cost of
power provided to the government in the off-take agreement2. Therefore, a government
might find it more beneficial to assume this risk itself, rather than allowing a project
company to be reimbursed for the cost of a commercial insurance.
Political Risk
This is the risk that any governmental change of policy would adversely impact
profitability. Usually, both foreign commercial lenders and foreign equity investors would
seek political risk insurance from their own export agencies or from such sources as the
World Bank.
There are several other risks involved in a BOT project, which would not be
covered in this chapter. These risks include technological, development, market, and
finally legal risk.
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In conclusion, the importance of the so called "security package" is that it depicts
the various risks involved in a BOT project, by assigning their coverage to one of the
parties. The following parties are expected to cover the following risks:
· Force Majeure: Host government
* Inflation Risk: Lenders and equity investors
* Foreign Exchange Risk: Host government
* Sovereign Guarantees: Host government
· Protection from Competition: Host government
* Completion Risk: Project sponsor & construction consortium
· Performance and Operating Risk: Construction contractors & equipment suppliers
* Cash Flow: Project company
* Political Risk: Foreign commercial lenders & foreign equity investors
49
F. Chapter References
1. The Coordinating Council of Philippines Assistance Programs: Introduction to BOT-
type Projects. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
2. Augenblick Mark, Custer Scott, and Ma'ani-Bruss Sovaida: The Build, Own and
Transfer approach to Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries. The World Bank,
Washington D.C., August 1989.
3. Price Waterhouse: Private Power Projects and Capital Market Development. Price
Waterhouse, Washington D.C., 1991.
4. Arthur Young International: Financing Privatization under Limited Capital
Conditions. Arthur Young International, November 1986.
5. Citibank: Development and Financing of Private Electric Power Projects in Asia.
Citibank, 1990.
6. World Bank: Private Sector Participation in Power through BOOT schemes. The
World Bank, 1990.
7. Cao, Andrew: Privatization of State Owned Enterprises, A Framework for Impact
Analysis. International Privatization Group, Price Waterhouse, August 1992.
50
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM BOT-TYPE
PROJECTS
A. Trends & Developments: Statistics on Privatization
Privatization, a relatively new word in the development terminology, means
different things to different people. This is evidenced by the variety of terms that have
already been used to describe the privatization process' : "peopolization" in Sri-Lanka,
"popular capitalism" in Chile and the all encompassing "private sector development" in
some other countries. In general terms, the word privatization depicts either the transfer
of ownership or management of SOEs (State-owned enterprises) to the private sector, or
the dilution of public ownership via increases in private financing of new projects 2. It is
the latter concept of privatization that is the subject of interest of this thesis.
The eighties marked the age of privatization. According to Privatization
International, the total proceeds of divested SOEs worldwide in 1988 were approximately
$29.5 billion. This figure went down to $24.7 billion in 1989 and to $25.3 billion in 1990.
Due to the abrogation of centrally-planned economic systems in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, privatization became an even more strategic development technique.
Consequently, the total proceeds of privatization reached $53.2 billion in 1991. In 1992, a
similar result was evidenced, with worldwide privatization transactions of over $53 billion
in total value3.
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Privatization implementation varies among different regions and countries. While
some countries have taken the initiative to adopt this means of development, other
preferred to wait and benefit from the experience of the "avant-guardistes". Mexico and
Chile can be clearly denominated as the precursors of privatization, and were the first to
realize positive results from their privatization programs, and their success served to
stimulate other countries such as Argentina and Brazil. In Mexico, around 200 public
sales of loss-making SOEs have raised $17 billion or approximately 7% of the country's
GDP (Gross Domestic Product). This process has allowed the government to turn around
the 8% budget deficit in 1981 to a surplus and bring inflation below 20% 4. Similar results
occurred in Chile.
Despite the positive results of Mexico's and Chile's privatization programs, some
countries still fear the political consequences of privatization as well as the labor
displacement issue involved in the implementation of such a process. For these reasons,
many countries have started their privatization programs under the form of private
financing of infrastructure projects rather than outright sales of existing SOEs'. This
method minimizes the risk of labor displacement while enhancing the supply of much-
needed infrastructure services, such as water, electricity, telecommunications or waste
removal. The latest data available regarding the financing of major infrastructure projects
by private capital indicates that $36.6 billion were assigned to such projects in 1993.
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Before we focus on the different Infrastructure Project Financing methods, and the
general issues involved in the process, it will be relevant to discuss the most popular
privatization objectives to date.
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B. Objectives of Privatization
Governments privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for numerous reasons, the most
important ones often being the reduction in the budget deficit, improvement in efficiency, and
revenue generation. There are also secondary objectives, which are often a by-product of the
privatization technique adopted6 (such as dispersion of share ownership, development of capital
markets, etc.). Some of these objectives, may and often do, conflict with each other; attempts
to accomplish numerous aims can result in a failure to achieve any. Governments involved in
the privatization process should do their best to balance conflicting objectives.
In the next section, we will review today's most popular privatization objectives and
determine their impact on the selection of privatization techniques.
1. Improving efficiency
In common usage, "efficiency" is not a very precise concept. For economists,
however, efficiency has a fairly exact meaning and is measured in a fairly precise way, namely,
by the amount of output that is derived from a given input. "Efficiency is therefore increased if
output rises without an increase in inputs" (Reference Number 1). It is hoped that transferring
ownership from the government to the private sector will improve production efficiency, ie.
managers in private enterprises will obtain more output than managers in public enterprises
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from given inputs of capital, labor, and intermediate materials. According to the World Bank
(1992), improving SOE performance is one of the most sought-after objectives of privatization.
A word of caution is necessary, however. The desired post-privatization efficiency will
be reached only if the managers of the enterprise are provided with incentives differing from
those they experienced when the government was the owner. Management will behave
differently and will have incentives to maximize the firm's profits under the following
conditions: if the market in which they are operating is competitive, if their pay is linked to their
performance, and if the capital market is fully functioning, thus pricing the company's shares
and/or, via the threat of bankruptcy (with no hope intervention from the government) or
takeover, thus imposing discipline on the firm and its managers7 . Transferring ownership alone
without a change in the working environment will have little impact on overall productivity and
efficiency.
Besides affecting management, privatization can also increase the productivity of the
employees. In the public sector, where security of employment is guaranteed, there is a
tendency for employees and management to be less concerned with their performance and
responsibilities. In the private sector, inefficient employees can be dismissed; this threat of
dismissal leads to an increase in efficiency. The inability to dismiss employees in public
corporations also increases militancy, which leads to labor market imperfections7.
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2. Reducing Government Borrowing and Expenditures
Government indebtedness, including the debt of its public corporations, has been
growing at a very rapid pace in most developing countries and in some industrialized countries.
Required future investments in infrastructure could further accelerate this trend unless
alternative sources of funding are found.
Undoubtedly, it is important to continue to enable public corporations to increase and
improve the essential services they provide. The question is how to fund such expansion and
improvement projects without further adding to national fiscal crises. Privatization of selected
public corporations through the injection of new equity capital, rather than an addition to the
country's debt burden, could provide the alternative source of funds, which could be key to
more dynamic, and more soundly financed, economic and social development in the years
ahead. A good example of the potential of privatization can be seen in the recent sale of
Telmex, the national Mexican telephone company. In 1990, the Mexican government, faced
with the daunting task of modernizing its archaic telephone system, opted to privatize Telmex
via a combination of private and public sale. 20% of the company was sold to qualified and
experienced international operators for $1.76 billion, while the rest of the shares were floated
on international stock markets for another five billion dollars8. The new operators committed
to invest $10 billion over the next five years, a sum the government could not have expended.
This privatization resulted in technology transfer in the telecommunication area, investments in
the nation's infrastructure, and large revenues to the government.
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Loss-making public enterprises, which require continuous subsidies and investments,
make good candidates for privatization. Their divestment can substantially reduce the annual
fiscal deficit incurred by governments8 .
3. Reducing Political Intervention
By divesting its shares in a company, the government will no longer interfere in the
daily management of the enterprise, which should result in an increase in economic efficiency
and managerial performance. Privatization will also reduce the government's conflict between
running the business and the desire to use state enterprises as a way of collecting taxes or
enforcing anti-inflationary price controls.
Finally, the privatization process will free up the government officials and let them
concentrate on their main task: governing the country. This will be quite beneficial since there
is a limited number of skilled officials carrying out a tremendous variety of tasks in most
developing countries. A Mexican official, who sat on the board of 300 companies (and thus
had to attend 300 board meetings per year), welcomed privatization as a measure to liberate
the government's resources and allow it to focus more on its social tasks7.
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4. Broadening Domestic Equity Ownership and Capital Market
Development
Privatization is an opportunity to redistribute assets and broaden ownership without
taking assets away from someone else. It enables a larger number of citizens to have an
opportunity to participate in and enjoy the benefits derived from the growth of the enterprise.
This broadened ownership results also in the high probability of new owners causing greater
management focus on results and less bureaucratic emphasis on process. Indeed, these
individual shareholders represent an independent and concerned monitoring process over the
performance of enterprises which the government can never filly duplicate.
Privatization can also help develop capital markets (and vice versa). Numerous
countries including Chile, France, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria and the UK, increased considerably
the number of shareholders and total market capitalization as a result of privatization. Table 1
highlights the number of new shareholders created by privatization as well as the proceeds from
sale as a percentage of stock market capitalization.
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Table 1: New Shareholders Created by Privatization.
Country Proceeds of Sales Proceeds as a % Number of New
Through Stock Exchange of Stock Market Shareholders
($US millions) Capitalization
Canada 812.0 0.4% N/A.
Chile (since 1985) 893.5 9.3% 63,316
France 5,148.1 3.0% 5,000,000
Jamaica 120.8 12.6% 30,000
Japan 76,500.0 1.7% 1,670,000
Nigeria 27.0 2.0% 400,000
Trinidad & Tobago 6.8 2.5% N/A.
Tunisia 8.6 N/A. N/A.
United Kingdom 51,720.5 6.0% 7,400,000
Source: The World Bank, "Privatization: The Lessons of Experience", April 1992.
As these figures demonstrate, privatization contributed tremendously at developing
the capital markets of these countries. In the UK alone, over 7 million shareholders were
created during the privatization wave (1979-1989). Similarly, in France, over 5 million
shareholders were created over two years only. In Jamaica, the sale of three companies
alone boosted market capitalization by 12%9.
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5. Attracting Foreign Capital and Expertise
The infrastructure investment and development needs in most developing countries
are still substantial, particularly for power, telecommunication, transportation, and water.
Privatization offers the opportunity to bring in new foreign capital and expertise, without
adding to indebtedness. Foreign equity investments can also build relationships, provide
access to new technology and provide management and technical skills and training' °. The
privatization of Telmex, the Mexican telephone company (mentioned above), which has
brought so far $6.76 billion in revenues and new technologies, is a good example.
6. Changing the Structure of Property Rights
A change in ownership can affect the structure of property rights and thereby
overcome existing bureaucratic failures. While, in effect, every taxpayer/voter is currently
a shareholder in the public enterprise sector, an explicit shareholding may induce those
voters who hold shares to take a greater interest in the performance of public enterprises.
Since their financial return is directly linked to the performance of the firm, they will no
doubt put more pressure on the management and might even fire them in case of bad
performance 9.
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Privatization will also allow people to choose the levels of their holding (if any) in
the industrial assets concerned, rather than being "forced shareholders" in the public
enterprises.
7. Reducing Trade Union power
It is believed that privatization can sometimes reduce the leverage of trade unions
in the privatized enterprises, leading possibly to increased efficiency in the use of labor and
less pressure towards wage-inflation9.
8. Increasing Competition and Consumer Welfare
Privatization coupled with appropriate liberalization and deregulation measures,
can create, increase or enhance competition. Competition in turn will impose pressures on
industry through the availability of alternative sources of supply of consumption goods
and the alternative uses of capital resources. This should lead to a reduction in prices,
improved services and goods, and accordingly, higher consumer welfare9.
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9. Retrenchment of the Public Sector
During the 1960s and 1970s, governments have diversified into numerous
unrelated and non-strategic areas such as hotels, tourism, manufacturing, etc. As the size
of the public sector grew, its administrative and financial burden became increasingly
heavy. Privatization is seen by many as a solution for controlling this growth and bringing
the size of the public sector back to manageable proportions7 .
In addition, the activities of many SOEs originally designed to play a catalytic role
in the development of the economy, no longer needs to be undertaken by the government
which otherwise might increasingly interfere with the private sector. Therefore, the
government will sell these companies or at least divest the non-strategic segments of these
enterprises.
10. Increasing Political Support
Most of the above objectives are aimed at increasing consumer welfare, which in
turn leads to increased votes and popularity for the government. Privatization therefore
can be considered as a policy of capturing votes.
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As mentioned earlier, some of the above objectives could conflict with each other.
For example, reducing the size of the public sector and/or maximizing the revenues to the
government may not be compatible with the goal of efficiency if it involves transferring
monopoly power from the public to the private sector without increasing competition.
When several objectives conflict with each other, the government will have to select the
over-riding objective(s) that best fit with its priorities and shape its privatization program
accordingly.
The methods chosen to implement a privatization program are likely to vary
according to the order of priority set by the government. Due to the scope of our thesis,
and since we are using all these general issues in order to find a suitable way of financing
the infrastructure in Lebanon, only the public-private partnership methods will be
discussed.
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C. Overview of Infrastructure Project Financing Methods
A new form of privatization has recently become popular: public-private
partnerships. In an increasing number of countries around the world, the public and
private sectors have joined together to overcome fimnding constraints and create necessary
new infrastructure projects. Although the balance of public and private responsibilities
varies among projects, public-private partnerships have one central strength: they draw on
the best of each sector to fulfill infrastructure needs which neither sector alone could
provide.
Since no borrowing on the part of the government or government agency is
involved, public-private partnerships shift the debt burden from the government to the
private sector. The government, in this manner, conserves its limited resources for other
social infrastructure needs such as health, education, flood control and drainage. By
attracting domestic and foreign private entrepreneurial energy and capital (both debt and
equity), the scheme contributes to the expansion and improvement of much needed
infrastructural facilities which otherwise would not have come onstream and whose
absence would constrain economic development of the country'. Furthermore, as part of
the privatization the private sector is likely to provide sound management, speedy
implementation and operational efficiency including the adoption of innovative design
features 8.
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Public-private partnerships in infrastructure involve a wide array of public-private
relationships with variables degrees of public and private responsibility'. Important factors
include nature of the developer's organization, source of initiative, who operates the
facility, ownership (including duration), financing sources, and type of revenues. The
most popular forms of public-private partnerships are presented below.
1. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
According to the World Bank, a Build-Operate-and-Transfer scheme can be
defined as a contractual arrangement whereby the contractor undertakes the construction,
including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the operation and maintenance
thereof. The contractor operates the facility over a fixed term during which it is allowed
to charge facility users appropriate fees, rentals, and charges sufficient to enable the
contractor to recover its operating and maintenance expenses and its investment in the
project plus a reasonable rate of return. The contractor transfers the facility to the
government agency concerned at the end of the fixed term. Depending on the time of the
transfer, the performance of the sponsor and the remaining economic life of the project,
the government may opt to extend the sponsor's operation of the project to some future
period in time5. Worldwide examples of BOTs include the Hopewell Power plant in the
Philippines, the Pakistan Hub River power plant, and the Malaysia Saba water supply.
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One major reason for the transfer feature has been the concern many governments
have regarding private ownership and control of sensitive or strategic economic activities
such as telecommunications, transportation and infrastructure, resulting in a hesitancy to
allow total privatization.
The main advantage of the BOT scheme is that it is supposed to provide significant
"additionality." When a government has neither the budgetary resources nor the
borrowing capacity to finance an infrastructure project as a public sector project, the BOT
formula offers the possibility of realizing a project which would otherwise not be built.
Financing "additionality" is provided in the form of the sponsor's equity investment, as
well as passive equity and subordinated debt'. In some cases, commercial banks may be
willing to lend to a BOT project with a specifically tailored security package where they
might not be willing to make new loans to the government itself. Ideal candidates for
BOT schemes are in the sectors of telecommunication, power, transportation, and water.
2. Build-Own-Operate (BOO)
The BOO method is used when the infrastructure facility is brand new rather than
existing, requiring financing for construction such as the Bangkok Hopewell Rail, the
Mexican toll road or the French MUSE tunnel9. The sponsoring consortium which
finances the project takes care of the construction and operations of the facilities as
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owners without worrying about transferring back the facilities to the host country
government. One major reason why the transfer is not considered by the government as
necessary is because it is not under political pressure to own the facilities. In general,
countries which are truly committed to private sector development and liberalization tend
to prefer this method over the BOT scheme.
3. Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO)
For governments which are not committed to privatization, a derivative of BOT
called Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) is used. Examples include the German and Hungary
toll roads and the Poland Modlin airport. With this method, there is no private ownership
and the operation resembles a franchise arrangement rather than a BOT9. BTO often has
public participation in funding and it is not unusual for the government to pay for
maintenance of the facilities. This method is preferred to the BOT when limiting legal risk
such as tort liability is a major concern, as it is generally more difficult to sue the
government than it is to sue a private concern'.
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4. Buy-Build-Operate (BBO) and Derivative Methods'°
In projects involving existing facilities, the sponsoring consortium can purchase the
assets from the government, expand capacity and then operate. This method, referred to
as Buy-Build-Operate (BBO), is used for by governments that are committed to
privatization and wish to expand the capacity of existing operations. Examples include the
Philippines light rail system, the Pakistan and Mexican telephone operations and the
Dublin, Ireland beltway.
A derivative of BBO is the Lease-Develop-Operate (LDO) method. This method
is similar to BBO except that full privatization is avoided through the government's
retention of ownership rights. Under this arrangement the government receives cash flows
as specified by the lease agreement and existing facilities are financed by the lessee. The
Toronto airport terminal, the Atlantic City International airport and the Kuala
Lumpur/Kauntan road are examples of LDOs.
Another derivative method allows the government to retain ownership of existing
facilities while the private sector financed expansion is owned by the sponsor. This
method is called Add-Own-Operate (AOO). Examples of AOO include an addition of a
fuel facility on an airport site which belongs to the government. This method is also used
if the government's objective is, for example, to maintain the existing labor force while
increasing the service supply and creating competition (thereby increasing efficiency)
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within the state-owned facility. A third derivative is called Contract-Add-Operate (CAO)
and is used in those cases where ownership is not allowed even for the private sector
financed expansion. These methods are popular in waste processing plant expansion
projects.
These are the major privatization techniques currently being used around the
world. Several combinations of the above methods exist as well. The choice of a
particular method will ultimately be dictated by 1) the objectives being sought by the
government, 2) the financial condition and record of performance of the enterprise, 3) the
legal organizational form of the SOE, 4) the sector of activity of the SOE, 5) the ability to
mobilize private sector resources, 6) the degree of development and sophistication of the
capital market, and 7) the political and economic constraints facing the government 9.
According to the World Bank, no generalization can be made as to the relative weight of
these elements in choosing how to privatize. Every country faces special economic and
political conditions which will have a unique impact on its privatization program.
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D. General Issues to be Considered in BOT-type Projects
While preparing and evaluating a BOT-type project, it is essential to thoroughly
study the various aspects involved in every stage of the process, starting from the initial
planning of the project to the actual implementation stage. The reason is that BOT-type
projects are very difficult to apply, and they usually encompass several variables which
affect the final outcome. Numerous lessons have been learned regarding all stages of this
type of projects.
BOT projects are increasing in dollar size, and they include now a larger number of
participants. Banks worldwide are reducing their lending in general, and this has a negative
effect on the availability of funds for higher-risk project financing'. The shrinking market
has resulted in new pressures on project development and financiers.
1. General Characteristics of Successful ProjectsS
· The local economy does not have the public funds allocated for capital projects, i.e.
there must be a strong need for private capital.
· The project must serve a pressing public need.
* The top levels of the public sector must feel that the private sector would be able to
perform the capital projects and manage the risks more efficiently and effectively.
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· The sponsoring agency should not be a competitor.
· The private developer must provide value added and possess irreproachable technical
expertise to design, build and operate the project.
* The awarded contractors / suppliers must be willing to get involved in turnkey design /
construction contracts with firm prices and completion terms and conditions.
* The project should be considered financeable on a limited-recourse basis. Non
recourse financiers need assurances that a project will be completed within budget and
on time.
* The project is able to collect substantial user fees and has the potential for non-user
revenues.
* A single agency should negotiate the binding agreement.
· The government should provide some backup credit support, this is usually provided
by multilateral development or export credit agencies.
* The technical, economic and commercial elements of a BOT-type project should be
closely integrated and coordinated. Clear communication between the project
participants at all stages of the project is necessary when working out financing
arrangements, especially when relying on syndicated financing.
* Personality traits of key individuals / managers involved in the BOT stages must not be
overlooked. Different personality types are needed at different stages of the project.
Due to the involvement of international participants, cultural difficulties will be
encountered, and adequate management of cultural issues by the project coordinator /
manager is needed at these times to avoid jeopardizing the project.
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2. General Problems Encountered
· The lack of availability of credible project developers and equity investors with
experience in packaging these projects.
· Competence of governments to provide the necessary level of cooperation, integration
and support for such projects.
· Formulation of workable corporate and financial structures. These projects are
extremely complex as they involve risk allocation and sharing arrangements.
* High Development Costs: Expensive consultants and advisors / lawyers.
* Conflict of Interests (i.e. between the needs of the project and expected financial
return of suppliers / contractors).
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E. General Lessons Learned'
The most common lesson learned throughout the execution of the numerous BOT-
type projects is that trust among the different project participants is a must. The
untrusting relationship between the private and public sector yields to misunderstandings
about the real incentive of each party, and these doubts usually amplify when negotiating
the sharing of risks'. The public and private negotiators should consider themselves as
partners instead of antagonists, since they have mutual interests, mainly the success of the
project in question. Misunderstandings do not profit to any of the parties, since they slow
the process of negotiations, and lead to the costly interference of "low value-added"
advisors, lawyers and arbitrators.
1. Negotiating Issues
1. Acceptance of Loss of Control:
At the early stages of a BOT-type project, the government gets troubled by the
perceived loss of control to the private sector. The government must discern the trade-off
involved in this process and abide to it.
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2. Acceptance of Public Sector Regulations:
The private sector must acknowledge that the government does not operate as a
private entity, and that it is difficult to the latter to commission one person to negotiate
freely on its behalf and virtually accept any reasonable setting advanced by the private
sector.
3. Allocation of Responsibilities to a Single Person:
The appointment of responsibilities to a single individual is paramount to the
timing involved in the execution of the project. Failure to assign a single authority to
negotiate on behalf of each party can cause a paralysis in the negotiations.
4. Need for Flexibility:
While negotiating a BOT-type project, flexibility is necessary for both the private
and the public participants.
5. Components of a Negotiating Team:
Governments are always at a disadvantage while negotiating with the private
sector, since they lack the expertise of the latter. It is to the government's benefit to
recruit expert advisors such as investment bankers, lawyers and environmental specialists
for the negotiation stage.
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2. Packaging Issues
One main cause of failure for BOT projects is a shortage of "packaging skills". In
other words, if the basic criteria of the scheme are not reasonable to all the participants,
the project is condemned to fail. Important issues to consider under packaging are:
1. Project Company:
The sponsoring company should approach the project based on the fact that it
owns stakes in this project, instead of acting as a financial or technical consultancy.
2. Timing:
Lengthy negotiations can ruin a project, being able to coordinate the required
resources in order to head off this problem is mandatory. All projects, regardless of their
dollar value, require the same amount of effort and negotiations to reach an agreement.
3. Private Sector Experience:
There is a very limited understanding and knowledge on the practical approaches
used to create the complex public-private partnership. BOT projects are usually managed
by private sector managers with little or no experience with the method.
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4. Public Sector Experience:
The public sector is relatively slow in developing a project and implementing it,
mainly because of the size of the public sector and the numerous interests involved in the
project. "The public sector has limited experience in the preparation and execution of
large infrastructure projects under the time and cost and profit conditions typically
encountered by the private sector" (Reference Number 5).
5. Selection Process:
The task of awarding a project should be assigned to an unbiased and independent
expert who should base his judgment on a competitive basis evaluation of the bidders.
Suspected favoritism would enhance the "losers" to delay the negotiations.
6. Provisions:
These partnerships should include exit provisions for weakly performing partners,
as well as entry provisions for new participants.
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3. Political Issues
1. Objectives and Constraints:
The host government should clarify its objectives and constraints, specifically the
financial ones. There must be adequate government funds and guarantees available for the
project and accordingly political will to employ the private sector's capabilities for the
project. In addition, there must be a pressing need for the project which has been
perceived for years by government officials. The roles and attitudes of the major "players"
in the scheme, such as the government, the equity investors, and lending agencies, are
crucial for a BOT-type project to work. Finally, there must be a clear commitment by the
government to support this type of project.
2. Political Risk:
International institutional investors are only attracted by countries with low
political risk. Political stability of a country insures the investors that the project would be
completed on schedule, without changes in the local laws and regulations.
3. Policy Framework:
The establishment of legislation on issues regarding foreign investment and
regulation of public utilities, is a prerequisite to the implementation of a BOT project. The
earlier in the process that the legislation is initiated, the higher the potential to attract
investors to the project.
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4. Project Risks
It must be understood by all parties that BOT-type projects include several risks
(discussed earlier in the previous chapter), and that these risks should be shouldered by the
parties who are most able to assume them Before the creation of a project's financial
structure, the project should be subjected to intensive risk analysis and the contractual
documents should incorporate mitigants to make the risks manageable for the lenders5.
Among the risks involved in a BOT scheme, are inflation and foreign exchange
risk, project / commercial risk, and political and country risk. At this time, the reader is
referred to the last section of the previous chapter, which consists of an analysis of the
security package of a BOT-type project.
Taking into account the above-mentioned lessons learned and risks involved, we
next examine a BOT project carried out in Pakistan, and another one undertaken in
Malaysia.
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F. Case Study: The Hub River Private Power Project of Pakistan
Over the past few years, the power generation market has seen the rapid growth of
private power generation facilities in the US and overseas. By combining project
financing techniques with long term power sales agreements, private companies have
developed a new segment in the power industry, namely BOT, and BOO. Having gained
momentum and experience in first world order countries like the US and Canada, these
techniques have started to be applied to power plants in developing nations.
The Hub River Power Project has been referred to by John Blackton, the Pakistan
director of USAID, as the "make or break" test for these types of projects in the
developing world. The Hub River scheme is the largest project by far of its kind ever
undertaken or even considered. Originally, the power station was designed to provide 500
MW, at an approximate cost of $900million. At that time, the Government of Pakistan
received two admissible proposals which it combined. The consequent output was
1,200MW to be provided from an oil-fired station at Hub Chowki, 50km west of Karachi,
costing roughly $1.88billion.
Although this project originated as a BOT-type project, through the negotiations
phase, its structure changed to a BOO scheme which will sell its output to the state-owned
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The BOO decision was made when
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the consortium decided that a BOT project was deemed contrary to privatization, a
primary objective of the Pakistani government at this juncture9.
Arrangement of the Consortium
The participants in the Hub River Power Project were Saudi, Pakistani, Japanese,
European and US companies. The main sponsor of the project was Xenel International
Energy of Saudi Arabia. Other sponsors included Mitsui & Co. of Japan and Hawker
Siddely Power of Great Britain. Price Waterhouse acted as the financial advisor to the
Government of Pakistan.
The makeup of the consortium has drastically changed as of December 1989, when
the original consortium dissolved and withdrew its offer. In May of 1991, the new
(current) consortium formed and submitted its formal offer9.
Project Financing
HUBCO, the project company, was to provide 20% of the total financing as equity
capital from both foreign and local shareholders. The remaining 80% was to be borrowed
from the PSA's. The private sector ended up supplying US$380 million of equity for the
scheme and $1.5 billion of loans (That amount included a substantial quantity of foreign
borrowings).
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The debt/equity ratio is constituted as follows°:
* Equity:
7.2% $136 million by the project company - HUBCO
5.3% $100 million raised through the public sale of convertible bonds.
7.7% $144 million from other overseas investors (CDC).
· Debt:
70% $1,313 Foreign Debt (ECAs, PSEDF, ECO [WB], CDC, and other).
10% $188 from local banks.
· Total Financing:
100% $1.88 billion
The project financing was structured in a way that money is supplied by the
commercial lenders against the revenue stream of the project rather than against the
balance sheet of the Government of Pakistan.
Lessons Learned'°:
1. Establish Strict Proposal Criteria and Ensure Compliance
As noted previously, the original project was priced approximately $900 million.
However, upon receipt of two acceptable proposals(from two different companies), the
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evaluating committee decided to combine the two offers resulting in over double the
original wattage, from 500MW to 1,200MW.
In addition, various contractual documents could have been prepared, although not
in their final form, prior to project development, such as the Fuel Supply Agreement and
the Power purchase Agreement. Such documents must identify and establish policies and
operating issues needed for a BOT-type project.
2. Keep Project Size Manageable
The total project cost rose from $900 million originally to the extreme figure of
$1.8 billion due to delays in the initiation of construction and fluctuations in exchange
rates. The final cost of the project ($1.8 billion) is considered to be a colossal figure for a
first time project and therefore more difficult to arrange the various required financing
schemes. According to a senior consultant at Price Waterhouse, in July 1991, a
contingency provision of $200 million to cover cost overruns was added to the project
cost, an obvious disadvantage of extending the project life.
3. Reduce Negotiations Stage
One key lesson implied from this project is that the negotiations phase should be
reduced to a minimum. Given the large number of participants involved in the BOT
process from start to finish, the negotiations will, de facto, be a trying process.
Negotiations for the Hub River project were drawn out and difficult for the sole reason
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that the Government of Pakistan did not commission one single authority to represent the
government. In addition to that, on both the public and the private sector sides, those
involved in the negotiations did not have "carte blanche" responsibility to commit their
respective parties to all agreements. One way to avoid these difficulties is by appointing
one predominant negotiator who is given the trust and power of his party/company, in
order to make the critical decisions.
In addition, according to the World Bank, the various government agencies and
other vested interests should be informed of the projects purpose, goals and objectives
which might impact upon their activities up front. However, at the negotiations stage
those interest groups should regroup and form one cohesive entity ready to represent the
government.
Due to the high complexity of BOT-type projects, both the public and the private
sectors should be aware, at the proposal development stage, of the legal elements involved
in such a project. Additional ways to reduce the negotiations phase to a minimum is to
identify the policies regarding relevant legislation, foreign investment issues, and legal
issues before the commencement of the project.
4. Maintain Close Relationship with the Government
The passing of the Sharia Law of Pakistan by the Muslim Court, as a supreme law,
could have directly affected the Hub River project, knowing that this ruling prohibits
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interest. As a consequence, Western bankers showed concern as they felt the potential
threat on the project returns Fortunately, the relationship of the sponsors with the
Pakistani Government was strong enough in order to ensure that the project must be
constructed and operated under the terms of the contract signed. In order to prevent
unnecessary impasses caused by the result of the ruling, the World Bank intervened in
association with the GOP (Government of Pakistan) and switched the governing law to
English.
According to Price Waterhouse, the financial advisor to the GOP, evidence of the
strong relationship which HUBCO has with the government, and the importance of that
relationship, is demonstrated through the numerous risks which the GOP was willing to
assume to make this project succeed. The GOP has accepted responsibility for the
performance of the utility to whom HUBCO will sell its power generated, the Water and
Power Development Authority (WAPDA).
Since Pakistan is rated weakly in terms of its credit-worthiness on International
markets, some additional guarantees and commitments were required from the GOP and
other governmental agencies. The resultant security package, governing law, developed
into four sets of documents for HUBCO. They are:
Government of Pakistan:
· Implementation Agreement
· Power Purchase Agreement
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5. Minimize Political Risk
The major challenge faced in financing private power in a developing country is to
minimize the political risk allowing banks to concentrate on the commercial risk of the
project itself Lessons learned from the Hub River Project concluded that the principal
risks under this project were political in nature, rather than technological or market
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related, and hence the involvement of development agencies was essential to spread this
developing country risk.
In order to bring in additional financing, the World Bank developed the Expanded
Cofinancing Operation (ECO). According to a responsible in the World Bank, ECO was
developed to get the project off the ground by attracting private financing through its
involvement in committing equity and substantial guarantees to other investors and
lenders.
A good incentive by the Pakistani Government to attract foreign capital ready for
investment, was to offer the lenders an insurance on foreign exchange risk. This
insurance, offered at an extremely competitive rate (3%) was designed to last the entire
life of the loans. In addition, the GOP has agreed to guarantee the performance of its
agencies, the Water and Development Authority (WAPDA), the State Oil Company, and
the State Bank of Pakistan.
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IV. THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR IN LEBANON
The electric power sector has been severely damaged during the war. Since most
of the other infrastructure sectors depend on it, its prompt repair is crucial to the
development of Lebanon. This chapter will describe the activities and problems of the
Electricite du Liban (EDL), Lebanon's electricity authority and will describe a suggested
solution to the quick rehabilitation of this sector.
A. Historical Background
The Electricite du Liban was established in 1954 when the Lebanese government
acquired the Franco-Belgian electric company providing electricity to Beirut'. Its
establishment was a result of a legislative decree restricting the production, transmission
and distribution of electricity in Lebanon to one independent government controlled entity.
The decree also requested the transfer of all publicly and privately invested electrical
establishments to EDL. All franchises and rights given to private enterprises were
automatically transferred to EDL once their licenses expired2. EDL is considered a
financially and managerially independent public establishment responsible for public
services. Although it has commercial and industrial characteristics, it is under the authority
of the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electric Resources. The latter approves EDL's
management, development plans, budgets, tariffs, loans, etc. By 1983 EDL had 3,000
employees and was regarded as a model government institution. It was profitable and
financed its own expansion 2.
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B. Organizational Structure of EDL2
The organization chart of EDL is typical of public corporations in Lebanon.
Executive power is entrusted in an administrative council which consists of seven
members (one of which is president). The duties of this council include planning,
legislation and supervising execution. The administrative acts through the general director,
which heads the two different units of the EDL. The general director sometimes delegates
authorities to regional managers responsible for certain provinces.
The EDL consists of two main units, technical and administrative, each of which is
divided into several departments. The technical unit consists of nine services:
· Production: produces energy from EDL plants and buys needed energy fiom other
plants.
* Transmission and Cooperation: transmits power produced through stations to become
suitable for consumption and transforms high tension voltage to medium voltage.
* Distribution: distributes current through overhead and underground cables.
* Studies and Design: designs plants, networks and stations, and conducts topographical
studies.
* Consumer Service: links lines to subscribers and installs meters.
* Measurement and Protection: repairs meters and transformers.
* Common Works: maintains machines, trucks and buildings.
· Works Service: handles civil engineering works of the EDL.
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· Computer Center: handles accounting, issues customer receipts, schedules salaries and
preserves technical information for statistical uses.
The administrative unit encompasses the corporation's infrastructure and the support
needed for the technical unit to operate. This unit also consists of nine services:
· Administrative and Organization: evaluates programs, organizes jobs and vacancies,
coordinates between different services, sets purchasing specifications and supervises
procurement.
· Secretary and Legal Consultants: handles legal work with subscribers and maintains
correspondence and archives.
* Accounting service: sets budgets, salaries and subscriber dues.
* Supply and Stores: stores cables, wires and other electrical equipment as well as office
supplies.
· Clients Service: organizes subscriptions, detects thefts and breakdowns, controls client
consumption and settles disputes with subscribers.
· Social and Medical Service: maintains medical files and provides employees and their
families with medical care.
* Personnel Service: handles employment, vacations and promotions. Also prepares
entrance exams with the Civil Service Board.
* Collection Service: responsible for collecting payments due.
* Self-Supervision Service: supervises the heads of services and workers.
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The Diwan or Secretary of Director General acts as a link between the general director
and administrative council. Figure 3 shows the organization chart of EDL.
The organization of EDL is very bureaucratic. The abundance of units increases
the separation between them and reduces flexibility and interdepartmental interaction. This
organizational weakness results in some of the problems mentioned in the following
sections.
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C. Demand For Electricity in Lebanon
This section will describe the past and expected future demand of electricity in
Lebanon. Based on the future demand forecasts, the requirements of new electric
generation and distribution systems will be considered.
Since electricity can not be efficiently stored in large quantities, it must be
produced on demand. The demand varies significantly during the course of the day. There
are two peak hours per day. These are periods of maximum load and they vary slightly
from month to month. Table 2 shows the peak hours of Beirut's electricity demand.
Table 2: Daily Peak Hours, as defined by EDL.
Month Morning Peak Hours Evening Peak Hours
January 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
February 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 .m. 5:15 p.m. to 9:15 p.m.
March 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 5:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.
April 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
May 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 6:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.
June 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 6:45 p.m. to 10:45 p.m.
July 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
August 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
September 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
October 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
November 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 4:45 p.m. to 8:45 p.m.
December 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 4:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.
Source: Reference number 2.
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These times are defined by the EDL. These hours are important to note since the capacity
of the electric power network must be able to generate electricity at a rate large enough to
serve the peak periods. Currently, the price of electricity is the same during the peak hours
and the off-peak hours. This is due to EDL's use of old meters which only read the total
quantity of electricity provided. In developed countries, digital meters are available. These
meters note the amount of electricity consumed during peak and off-peak hours. The use
of such meters enables the utility company to raise the cost of electricity during the peak
hours.
1. Demand Determinants
There are many determinants to demand. These include wealth, level of
industrialization, population growth, rate of increase of population served and electricity
consumed per capita2. Only the three most important factors will be considered for the
sake of simplicity. These are population size, economic growth and the rate at which
electricity is sold.
Population is one of the main factors affecting demand of electricity. A future
population forecast for Lebanon will enable the prediction of the future demand for
power. One important point to consider is that while Lebanon had a somewhat constant
population between 1974 and 1988, the demand for electricity increased significantly
during that period, as can be shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Population Vs Energy Consumed in Lebanon.
















Source: Reference number 2.
Economic growth is another important factor affecting demand. Economic growth
increases wealth and industry, which both increase the demand for electric power. During
the war in Lebanon, the demand for electricity increased significantly even though the
GDP decreased 2. Table 4 shows that even though he GDP was affected in 1975-1982, the
energy consumed still increased steadily.
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Table 4: GDP Vs Energy Consumed in Lebanon.
Year GDP in Lebanese Pounds Energy (MW-h)














Source: Reference number 2.
The tariff of electricity is the third factor affecting demand for electricity. Even
though the rates for electricity have increased significantly in Lebanon, the demand for
electricity has been increasing steadily. Albeit, the real value of the Lebanese Pound also
decreased significantly during that period, making the tariff increases less significant2.
Table 5 shows the years in which the rates for electricity have increased versus
consumption. This proves that the demand for electricity is inelastic to price increases.
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Table 5: Years of Power Tariff Increase and Energy Consumed.
Year Tariff Increase Energy (MW-h)
















1980 Tariff Increased 2327
1981 Tariff Increased 2596






1988 Tariff Increased Twice 4076
Source: Reference number 2.
2. Future Demand Forecasts
The urgent need for expansion of the electric power sector is emphasized by the
high expected future demand for electricity. Although there are no exact predictions of
future demand for power in Lebanon, there are some estimates which are not
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quantitatively accurate but which point out the high future demand. At this point it is
important to note that it is difficult to predict demand of electricity in Lebanon for several
reasons3: First, the past production of EDL in the 1980s does not reflect demand, since the
production was not satisfying the demand. One must keep in mind that exact demand is
more than production, since the power was rationed during that period. This fact is proven
by the widespread use of private generators both on the household and industrial levels.
Second, since the electricity bills have not been collected for many years, future demand
could be altered when the bills will be collected and more realistic prices set. Third, it is
uncertain how quickly Lebanon's economy will recover in the coming years.
The MIT-AUB joint research estimate the yearly rate of growth of electricity
demand in Lebanon to be 14%'. Another model assumes steady linear demand and
concludes that the demand of energy will increase according to the following equations2:
E = 163T + 140
P= 97T+ 45
where E is energy demand, P is power and T is unit of time. These equations were derived
from Table 6.
These equations imply that for every unit increase in time, the power demand will increase
by 145 MW and the energy will increase by 303 MW-h.
99
Table 6: Energy and Power Consumed Vs Time.




























Source: Reference number 2.
Three scenarios for demand will be considered in this section3 : Historical trend
(low growth) scenario, MIT-AUB research program (medium growth) scenario and
EDL's 1990 prediction (high growth) scenario.
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The historical trend scenario linearly projects the historical growth of demand for
electricity in Lebanon. The scenario might be possible if the situation in Lebanon remains
unchanged. The scenario envisions the peak demand to increase at a constant rate of about
34.8 MW per year3.
The MIT-AUB forecast projects an 11% growth in demand for electricity between
1992 and 1995 due to population influx and industry rebuilding, a 9% growth between
1995 and 2002 as population remains steady and industry grows, and a 7% growth
between 2002 and 2006 as industry growth stabilizes. The base load used is 1110 MW in
19923.
EDL's prediction for future electricity demand is based on a report written by
EDL's production director, Lucien Letayef. EDL estimates the demand growth to be 12%
from 1990 to 1995 and 10% between 1995 and 2000. The 1990 base demand is estimated
to be 1000 MW. These estimates are based on the historical growth since 1965, which
varied between 8% and 15% per year. Table 7 shows the numerical results of these
scenarios.
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Table 7: Peak Load for Demand Scenarios (MW).
YEAR Historical Trend MIT-AUB Forecast EDL Forecast
(Low Growth) (Medium Growth) (High Growth)
1992 949.8 1110.0 1254.4
1993 984.6 1232.1 1404.9
1994 1019.4 1367.6 1573.5
1995 1054.2 1518.0 1762.3
1996 1089.0 1654.7 1938.5
1997 1123.8 1803.6 2132.4
1998 1158.6 1965.9 2345.6
1999 1193.4 2142.8 2580.2
2000 1228.2 2335.7 2838.2
2001 1263.0 2545.9 3122.1
2002 1297.8 2775.0 3434.3
2003 1332.6 2969.3 3777.7
2004 1367.4 3177.2 4155.5
2005 1402.2 3399.6 4571.0
2006 1437.0 3637.5 5028.1
2007 1471.8 3892.2 5530.9
2008 1506.6 4164.6 6084.0
2009 1541.4 4456.1 6692.4
2010 1576.2 4768.1 7361.7
2011 1611.0 5101.8 8097.9
Source: Reference number 3.
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
-- Historical Trend (Low Growth)
---- MIT-AUB Forecast (Medium Growth)
-- EDL Forecast (High Growth)
Source: Reference number 2.
Assuming that the linear historical trend is conservative for future forecasts, we
can disregard it. Both the MIT-AUB forecast and the EDL forecast agree that the demand
for power in Lebanon will multiply at least fivefold. Such a quick rise in demand for power
will need to be satisfied by large investments in power generation equipment and some
transmission and distribution equipment. Since EDL is already facing difficulties in
satisfying the current 1,000 MW demand, it can be assumed that EDL will need assistance
in supplying the anticipated 5,000 MW or 8,000 MW demand.
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D. EDL's Production Capabilities
EDL depends on gas oil, steam and hydroelectric energy to generate electricity. In
October 1993, the network's total installed capacity was about 1500 MW. The
distribution of this generating capacity is divided as follows4 :
· Gas oil power plants: 166 MW.
· Steam power plants: 1058 MW.
· Hydroelectric power plants: 282 MW.
However, due to the many problems mentioned in the next section, the total capacity that
can be achieved by the network is 1200 MW. In 1991 the network was providing only 811
MW of energy'.
1. Gas Oil Turbines 4
Due to the old age of EDL's gas oil turbines and lack of maintenance, these can
produce only 50 MW of energy, out of a total of 156. Table 8 lists the individual turbines
and their expected capacity after the system's rehabilitation.
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Table 8: Installed, Present and Expected Capacity of Gas Oil Turbines.
Turbines Installed Capacity Present Capacity Expected Capacity
(MW) (MW) After Rehabilitation
Westinghouse 30 28 28
Westinghouse 30 - 28
Westinghouse 30 28
Westinghouse 30 - 28
AEG 23 22 22
AEG 23 - 22
TOTAL 166 50 156
Source: Reference number 4.
Only 30% of the Gas Oil turbines' capacity is currently being used. After rehabilitation,
94% of the initially installed capacity could be exploited. About 6% of the capacity will be
lost due to the age and poor maintenance of the turbines.
2. Steam Power Plants 4
Most of Lebanon's electricity is produced by steam power plants. Most of these
plants are located at Zouk and Jieh. Similar to the case of gas oil turbines, the capacity of
the steam turbines is also greatly reduced due to the lack of spare parts and poor
maintenance. Table 9 shows the installed, present and expected capacities after
rehabilitation.
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Table 9: Installed, Present and Expected Capacity after Rehabilitation of Steam
Turbines.
Turbine Installed Capacity Present Capacity Expected Capacity
(MW) (MW) after Rehabilitation
Zouk Ansaldo GIE 145 130 145
Zouk Ansaldo GIE 145 130 145
Zouk Ansaldo GIE 145 145
Zouk Alsthom 172 172 172
Jieh Toshiba 62 55
Jieh Toshiba 62 35 55
Jieh ABB 69 - 60
Jieh ABB 69 45 65
Jieh ABB 69 65
Kadisha 1 25 17 17
Kadisha 2 25 13 13
Kadisha 3 70 _ 70
TOTAL 1058 542 1007
Source: Reference number 4.
Only about 50% of the installed capacity is currently being used. Once rehabilitated, the
steam turbines will use 95% of the original installed capacity. 5% of the installed capacity
will be lost due to the damage and maintenance patterns.
3. Hydroelectric Power Plants 4
The main hydroelectric power plants are established on the Litani River. These can
not operate all year round due to the seasonal drop in the water levels. Table 10 shows the
capacity of the main hydroelectric turbines.
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Source: Reference number 4.
Other hydraulic plants are situated around the country. They do not have water storage
facilities and therefore their operation is dependent upon the flow of the rivers.
4. Transmission 4
EDL transmits power through and integrated 150-60 KV network connected to
the Syrian grid at Anjar in the East and Deir Nebouh in the North. Figure 5 shows the
location of the network in Lebanon.
5. Distribution 4
The distribution occurs at four medium voltage levels: 33, 15, 11 and 5.5 KV. The
11 KV lines supply the city of Beirut and the 15 KV lines supply the rural areas of the
country. The 5.5 KV lines exist in the older parts of the grid. The medium voltage
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substations are numerous and their lines span many miles. They provide electricity at
110/190 V and 220/380 V.
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Figure 5: Map of Electrical Power Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure in
Lebanon.
Source: Iskandar. Marwan "The Lebanese Economy in 1993" Banque De La Mediteranie. March 1994.
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E. Problems in EDL
The existing network suffers several problems that hinder EDL's performance. The results
of these problems is the financial decline of EDL and the inefficiency in its service. These
problems include:
1. War-related Damages 2
The network suffered large amounts of damage as a consequence of the civil war.
Power plants, transmission cables and fuel tanks have been partially and sometimes
completely destroyed. Other damages include direct hits to transformation stations, tens of
thousands of poles destroyed, miles of cables cut, trucks seized and equipment stolen. The
damages between the 1975-1985 period amounted to approximately 104m US Dollars.
Table 11 shows a yearly estimate of the damages inflicted on the network. These damages
resulted in a drastic reduction of EDL's capacity to produce and distribute electricity. The
electric power sector of the infrastructure suffered substantially because much of its
equipment (Transmission cables, transformers .. etc.) is exposed. This results in damage
due to local fighting, which in turn prevents accessibility and repair. Another consequence
of the war is the isolation of some parts of the network. Once the distribution pattern was
segmented, the distribution efficiency is greatly reduced and caused and unbalance in the
allocation of power resources. The network lost its continuity and forced EDL to ration
power.
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Table 11: Damages to EDL's Network.






Source: Reference number 2.
2. Lost Revenues 2
During the war, few of the bills issued by the EDL were collected. This is due to
many causes, namely: lack of government control and authority, deteriorating security and
military situations, lack of organizational and managerial control in the public sector, high
cost of living, devaluation of the Lebanese Pound and increasing internal emigration.
These factors resulted in the inaccuracy of reading subscriber consumption, slackness in
delivering the information in the central database, and consequently issuing bills that do
not reflect the amount of power consumed. The non-existent mail system requires EDL to
send employees to subscribers in order to collect bills. The bills are seldom collected and
the amount collected was a fraction of EDL's expenses. Although bills collection was
improved in the early 1990s, the amount of money collected corresponded to less than
10% of the cost of energy produced. Table 12 shows the amount of uncollected bills that
decreased the revenue of EDL.
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Table 12: Amount of EDL's Uncollected Revenues.















Source: Reference number 2.
3. Theft z
Even though every electrical utility company suffers the "fiee riders" phenomenon, that
amount does not usually exceed 5% in developed countries. In Lebanon the number of
illegal consumers has reached critical levels during the war. They are an important factor
in the increase of demand for electricity since they do not use electricity conservatively
(since they do not pay for it). The excess consumption results in power shortages and
rationing. Although energy theft is a phenomenon associated with the consumers who do
not own meters, many subscribers connect lines to the network without passing through
the meters. This allows them to use more power than the meter would allow and not pay
for it. Each year, a larger percentage of EDL's production is consumed illegally and hence
deprives EDL from its much needed revenues. Table 13 depicts the extent of energy theft
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in Lebanon. The authorities have not been able to control energy theft due to an absence
of government control. EDL resorted to ineffective media campaigns. In the period
ranging from 1975 to 1986, EDL estimates that 8,354 million KW-h have been stolen, an
equivalent of 32% of the total generated energy in that period.
Table 13: Stolen Power in Lebanon.
Year Power Generated (MW-h) Power Stolen (MW-h) % Stolen
1974 1580 0
1975 1550 179 11.55
1976 858 136 15.85
1977 1495 196 13.11
1978 1649 261 15.83
1979 1665 461 27.69
1980 2180 325 14.91
1981 2464 588 23.86
1982 2273 783 34.45
1983 2635 1032 39.17
1984 2497 1120 44.85
1985 3036 1563 51.48
1986 3474 1710 49.22
TOTAL 25779 8354 32.41
Source: Reference number 2.
4. Internal Problems 2
EDL suffers many production problems, as a result of which the performance of
the company has declined severely. These problems can be grouped into two categories,
technical problems and personnel problems. The technical problems are a result of delays
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in the maintenance and upgrading of the power grid and are due to the difficult situation
during the hostilities. Maintenance problems led to further deficiencies in production and
hindered EDL from meeting the increasing demand for power.
Since the beginning of the war, the generators of EDL have not been properly
maintained. The attitude of the maintenance staff was "don't fix it until it breaks," instead
of proactive maintenance. This attitude resulted in maintenance taking place only after a
breakdown, which reduced the capacity and lifetime of the generating equipment.
Moreover, EDL never had (for financial reasons) reserve generators. The latter are used
to temporarily replace generators when they were being maintained or when they broke
down. As a result, EDL rationed power in case a generator broke down or was being
maintained.
Transmission cables and transformation stations also needed continuous
maintenance. Maintaining such equipment was difficult since few technicians were willing
to perform this task amongst the hostilities. Also, many areas were under the control of
militias and EDL had little access to them. The neglect of such equipment resulted in its
deteriorated condition, sabotage and theft.
Another factor that affected the prompt repair of EDL's equipment is the lack of
spare parts. EDL seldom kept an inventory of often needed spare parts. Once a problem
arised with the equipment, the purchasing department ordered spare parts from overseas.
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These parts took several weeks to arrive to EDL, and production would be disrupted until
the parts were replaced.
One last factor that hindered production was the availability of fuel for the
generators. The production of local refineries did not meet the needs of the EDL and
hence fuel was imported from neighboring countries. This resulted in higher costs of fuel
and delays in delivery. The unreliability of fuel supplies, whose transportation was slowed
by the war, also affected the performance of EDL. Moreover, the quality of the fuel
obtained is not always satisfactory, and that contributed to shortening the lifetime of the
equipment and making its maintenance more difficult.
EDL also faces problems with its personnel. Due to political reasons, EDL has not
appointed any full-time employee for 10 years. Personnel needs were filled by hiring
temporary employees. Many employees left their positions due to immigration, early
retirement or other better-paid jobs. This left much work to be done by few qualified
personnel, which substituted quality to meet everyday requirements. The personnel
problem can be summarized by the following list:
* Lack of qualified personnel since EDL could not afford them.
* Some employees use their jobs for personal profit.
* Salaries were low compared to qualifications.
· The seniority concept resulted in unqualified employees in key positions.
* The lack of incentive results in the carelessness of personnel.
115
· Employee morale was low due to unfavorable factors such as favoritism and
sectarianism.
· Many employees do not report to work or do not perform their jobs.
The organization structure of EDL is complex and bureaucratic. Restructuring is
needed in order to achieve flexibility and increase the morale of personnel. Job
descriptions and responsibilities must be clearly stated and applied. Unqualified employees
must be replaced with qualified ones which must be appointed in key positions.
5. Financial Situation 2
Before the war EDL was a financially sound and independent institution. New
projects were financed by the excess profits incurred from the high revenues of selling
power. Today, EDL is financially dependent upon the government and it constantly seeks
funding from Arab and international funds for its projects. These changes are a result of
the extensive war-related damages to its equipment, power theft, increase in operating
costs, etc.
EDL's sources of revenue are installation fees and power charges. The revenue is
collected in Lebanese Pounds. The devaluation of the Lebanese Pound drastically
decreased the real revenues of EDL:
· Wages have multiplied around 50 times between 1974 and 1991.
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· The revenues collected in Lebanese Pounds do not cover the salaries of employees, let
alone other costs.
* The payments for equipment and spare parts is made in foreign currency.
The rapid increase in the cost of fuel, equipment and spare parts as well as covering for
the equipment damages due to the war forced EDL to increase its power charges on
several occasions (see Table 5). The deficits of EDL since 1975 are depicted in Table 14.
Table 14: EDL's Profits/Losses.












Source: Reference number 2.
Due to many economical and political reasons, the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electrical
Resources did not allow EDL to increase the power charges to keep up with increasing
costs and the devaluation of the Lebanese Pound. In 1987 EDL was allowed to increase
its rates, however, by that time the US Dollar was worth LL 225 (45 times its value in
1982). In 1992 the tariff was increased once again, but the revenues of EDL still do not
cover its costs.
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The rapid increase in fuel and gas prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s added to
the costs of EDL and increased the gap between the high costs and low revenues. The
Lebanese government decided to cover some of EDL's deficits by paying some of its
energy bills, which constitute the largest portion of the deficit. However, when the
government was burdened by its own loans in the late 1980s, it froze all subsidies to EDL
except for loans for fuel and spare parts.
The devaluation of the Lebanese currency and hence the decrease in real revenue
of the EDL also added to EDL's budget deficit. EDL had borrowed considerable amounts
of money in foreign currency at relatively high interest rates to finance its projects and
expansion in the early 1980s. In order to preserve its creditworthiness and the credibility
of the Lebanese government, EDL borrowed locally (from the Lebanese Treasury and
Banque du Liban) in order to repay its foreign loans. Consequently, EDL is incapable of
paying its loans and fell deeper in debt.
EDL's total debt in 1991 was 273 million US Dollars and 37 billion Lebanese
Pounds. The debt can be broken down into:
1. $ 38m in foreign loans
2. $ 20m in debt to foreign contractors
3. Local debt:
* $ 90m and LL 1.08 billion debt to Banque du Liban
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* $ 125m and LL 150m debt to Council for Development and
Reconstruction
* LL 35.15 billion in Treasury Bills
4. Other debt includes unpaid fuel bills, which are covered by the government.
EDL's financial situation is very critical. Due to the depressed economic condition
today, it is difficult for EDL to increase its tariffs to cover its debt. Consequently, it is also
difficult for EDL to borrow money to finance its much needed capacity expansion. The
next section will propose a solution to expanding EDL's capacity and quality of service
without having to borrow large sums of money to finance these improvements.
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F. Tariff Structure3
One of the major causes of EDL's financial problems is the effects of low tariffs. In
1982, EDL increased its tariffs to LL 0.375/KWh, equivalent to $0.095/KWh. This tariff
was designed to allow EDL to balance its expenditures by 1983. Unfortunately the war
events and the devaluation of the Lebanese Pound prevented it from reaching this goal.
The currency depreciation caused the tariff per KWh to decrease from an equivalent of
$0.095 in 1982 to $0.005 in 1989. Afer it was increased in 1991, it reached $0.03/KWh
in 1992, still much below the cost of production.
The current tariff is based on the category of consumers. For large consumers such
as factories, peak pricing is applied at two periods. At other times, a flat rate applies: LL
45/KWh for 100 KWh or less and LL55/KWh for any consumption above 100 KWh.
These rates were designed using an average system cost approach based on current
exchange rates and historical costs. Currently, other tariff structures are being proposed,
since the current structure is not meeting EDL's objectives. The objectives that a new
tariff structure should try to meet are:
1. 'The efficient allocation of national economic resources and the economically efficient
utilization of electric energy.
2. The satisfaction of conditions of fairness and equity including the allocation of costs
among consumers based on their consumption and its effects on the system
120
performance, the stabilization of prices, the transparency of bill calculations and the
provision of a minimum level of service for low-income consumers.
3. The raising of sufficient revenues to pay all costs of operations and capital.
4. The satisfaction of all political social, economical objectives of the government."
Simultaneously satisfying all of these objectives is difficult and a good tariff structure is
one that can meet a large part of them. EDL needs to find a structure unique to the
objectives of the Lebanese Government. The government currently needs to recover the
debts of EDL and meet the new challenges of recovery and income redistribution.
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G. Substitutes
The frequent electric power rationing in Lebanon encouraged the public to find
substitutes to the Government's electric network. In the early eighties, when the reduction
in EDL's service was still acceptable, private generators were used by a limited number of
institutions, such as hospitals and factoriesl. Most other subscribers kept relying on the
EDL's services. However, in the late eighties the government could only provide an
average of 6 hours of electricity per day. This pushed the private sector to react promptly
and begin using private generators. The use of these generators is widespread in Lebanon.
The smaller portable models are used by small stores and houses while the larger ones
supply buildings and factories with electricity. Most consumers rely on generators as a
"backup" whenever they do not get power.
Even though private generators seem convenient, there is a significant
disadvantage to the public's reliance on them. Generators are fuel or diesel operated and
contribute significantly to the rising problem of air pollution in Beirut. Many buildings and
most shops in the downtown area rely on generators. These run about 5 to 12 hours per
day and their smoke is released untreated. Another disadvantage is the noise pollution they
cause. Even though the larger generators are strategically located in basements, they can
still be heard several meters away. Finally, the generators are expensive to operate and
maintain. The cost of EDL's electricity is a fraction of the cost of privately generated
electricity. The widespread use of these generators despite their operating costs is an
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encouraging indicator that the prices of EDL's electricity could be raised in order to raise
its quality and reliability of service.
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H. Emergency Plan 5
In 1991, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) commissioned
International Bechtel and Dar Al-Handassah Consultants to undertake studies for the
recovery planning of Lebanon. The report advised on 14 "priority" projects for the electric
power sector. According to the report, these projects are part of a national emergency
recovery program that would be implemented to rebuild Lebanon's infrastructure. The
CDR is supervising the implementation of these projects. The projects are due to be
completed by the end of 1994. Table 15 briefly describes these projects.
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Table 15: Priority Projects for The Electric Power Sector.
Proj ect Project Title Funding Implementatio
Number Requirements ($) n Time
(Months
1.1 Rehabilitation of Zouk Power Plant 25,000,000 12 - 15
1.2 Rehabilitation of Jieh Power Plant 18,500,000 12 - 15
1.3 Rehabilitation of Hraiche Power 8,000,000 12
Plant
1.4 Installation of Unit 6 at Hraiche 45,000,000 18 - 24
Power Plant
1.5 Rachmaya Hydroelectric Plant 1,500,000 6 - 8
1.6 Overhead Transmission 8,000,000 8 - 12
1.7 Underground Transmission Cables 5,000,000 12
1.8 Substations 30,000,000 12 - 15
1.9 Medium and Low Voltage 50,000,000 12 - 24
Networks
1.10 Hydro - Power on the Litani River 6,000,000 15
1.11 Support Facilities for EDL 16,000,000 15 - 24




1.13 Power Master Plan same as above 6 - 8
1.14 Rehabilitation of other 7,000,000 12- 15
Hydroelectric Power Plants
Source: Reference Number 5
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L. Need for Privatization
The issue of privatization has been suggested several times in Lebanon but never
seriously considered. Currently the government is undertaking most of the reconstruction
efforts without allowing the private sector to participate. However, in light of the many
problems EDL is facing and the need to satisfy the large future demand of electricity,
privatization seems to be an option'.
EDL currently encounters problems on all levels: infrastructural, financial,
technical and managerial. The government is not able to assure EDL acceptable working
conditions. EDL's privatization could have the following advantages:
· Speed in decision-making. The private sector can quickly provide personnel that are
technically and managerially qualified in order to modernize EDL's management. The
private sector can also make changes and enforce them. Currently EDL is bound by
the laws and bureaucracy associated with government agencies.
* Money lenders could be more encouraged to give loans to the private sector if the
latter has proof of reliable experience. Lenders are skeptical of the government's
abilities in providing the required management.
* The profit incurred by the private sector could finance more investments and
operations. The private sector will have a vested interest in improving management,
efficiency and modernization.
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· In Lebanon, consumers tend to respect and support the performance of the private
sector while they remain suspicious of the government.
* The private sector can assure proper financing for operations. The government has a
limited reconstruction budget and will have difficulty raising the capital necessary for
future expansions. The previous section concluded that in 20 years Lebanon will
require about five times its current generating capacity.
· By allowing the private sector to participate, the government will concentrate its
efforts on governing rather than on managing corporations.
* If a public private partnership is allowed, the government will inherit, at the end of the
project period, a well-managed corporation capable of sustaining itself.
There are three components of EDL that can be privatized. The first is production,
where the private sector can undertake turnkey projects and sell the output to the
government. Little exploitation can be achieved since the producer is limited by contracts
to sell to the government at preagreed prices. Transmission could also be privatized. The
private enterprise can undertake the management of the transmission equipment and
assure efficient dispatching of power between the producer and the distributing
substations. The private contractor can optimize the management and the use of the
equipment in order to achieve this at the lowest possible cost. The contractor will also
properly maintain the equipment in order to optimize transmission.
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Finally, distribution can be privatized. Lebanon consists of many autonomous
regions each with its own demographic character. Creating several autonomous
distribution companies which will optimize bills collecting and have a vested interest in
stopping theft of energy. The contractor will assure efficient collection of bills in the
shortest time possible. The companies can compete in efficiency of service and customer
satisfaction.
One often used point against privatization is the private sector's potential abuse of
monopolies. Consequently abuse can be minimized if the state ensures that:
All the declared expenses are reasonable and justified.
· The cost of the produced energy must be strictly justified.
* All developments and access to electric power must be fairly distributed around the
Lebanese territory (even to the small villages).
* Continuity in production and distribution of current are assured.
* The government must be able to intervene to extend its control and enforce
agreements. Also, the state must be able to intervene in case the contractor abuses a
monopoly.
· Profit that is reinvested in electric service is not taxed.
There are many other issues that could be debated if privatization is to materialize.
One such issue is the fate of the 3500 personnel currently employed by EDL. The next
section will describe a suggested public-private partnership that, in the opinion of the
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authors, will solve some of EDL's problems and still enable the government to keep in
control of the electric power sector.
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V. BOT Framework for Lebanon's Electric Power
Sector
The previous chapter demonstrated the problems that the current electric power
sector is facing in Lebanon, and demonstrated the high expected demand for power in the
next twenty years. This chapter will describe how a successful BOT project can be
implemented in Lebanon. The chapter will start with a description of the project and an
evaluation of it. It will then describe several crucial aspects of it. Each of these aspects will
be depicted in detail in a separate section. Afterwards, a summary of the security package
will be described, including the responsibilities of each of the various parties involved. By
using information about Lebanon and lessons learned from experience in other countries,
the conditions each party must adopt will be described in order to achieve the best results
in Lebanon. Such a project could be a prelude for a series of BOT projects that will
follow. Public-private partnerships will facilitate a quick recovery for Lebanon, even
though the government has limited financial resources from which to draw.
A. Project Overview
1. Need for BOT Project
The forecasts of the future demand for electricity in Lebanon conclude that by year
2012 the demand will reach between 5,000 MW and 8,000 MW'. EDL's current capacity
is about 1,000 MW 2, which is not enough to meet the present demand, let alone the
rapidly growing future demand. EDL is facing many problems in managing the generation
and transmission of the current supply. Due to its various financial, managerial and
infrastructural problems, we can assume that EDL will not be able to efficiently manage
the heavy generation expansion needed to satisfy future demand. Based on this
assumption, we can suggest that foreign capital and expertise help in this expansion.
Since many countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Chile are privatizing state
enterprises in order to alleviate their governments of the financial and managerial burden
public enterprises carry, one might suggest that EDL follow the same process. However,
the socioeconomic climate in Lebanon is not yet ready to accept full-scale privatization.
The government is purposely bureaucratized in order to allow all the minorities a share in
the decision-making process. Removing government control will reduce the full
representation of all the minorities in the decision-making process of a strategic sector of
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the infrastructure. Based on this assumption, we can conclude that full scale privatization
is not yet an option in Lebanon.
The optimum solution for such a case is to allow a public-private partnership in the
generation of electric power. Based on a BOT contract, a private investor can undertake
the financing, construction, maintenance and operation of a power generation plant for a
certain period of time. The output of such a plant can be sold to EDL at a pre-agreed
upon tariff. At the end of the concession period, the ownership of the plant will be
transferred to the Lebanese government. Such a solution will ensure that EDL remains in
control of its 1,000 MW generating capacity and the transmission of all power in Lebanon.
EDL can use all the funds allocated to it by the Council for Development and
Reconstruction (CDR) to repair the transmission network, rehabilitate its power plants,
invest in bills collection, control the theft of power, change its organizational structure and
recruit qualified personnel. The BOT contractor will undertake the needed expansion of
the power generation by building a plant and selling power only to EDL. The government
will remain in control of the electric power sector by controlling the transmission and
distribution of power.
Such projects have been undertaken in other developing countries such as Turkey
and Pakistan. For example, the Government of Pakistan wishes to increase the country's
generating capacity but does not have the expertise or the finance to undertake such a
project3 . Using a BOT scheme for the Hub River project, the capacity of the country can
1 on
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be increased by 1,200 MW (refer to Chapter 3). The operation and financing is provided
by the project sponsor, and the Pakistani Government is the client for all of the generated
power. The project value was $1.8 billion and the government could not have secured
loans to unilaterally finance such a project. Other positive externalities of such projects
include the transfer of foreign technology and expertise to the developing country.
2. Project Proposal
The government should use a modestly-sized project to have a first-time
experience with BOT projects. If the experience is successful, then the rest of the capacity
expansion should be considered on a BOT basis. For the purpose of the thesis. we can
assume that the power generation plant to be built will have a capacity in the order of 500
MW. Such a large plant will require international expertise in the construction and
operations phase. Its high costc-p to $600 million (depending on the technology used),
will also require international financing. We can assume that the Council for Development
and Reconstruction will not allocate such a high amount of money to the electric power
sector, and therefore a BOT-type project is needed.
The government must approve of a suitable location of the plant. EDL, the client
of the project, must purchase a daily requirement of power from the plant. The sponsors
must setup a project company, which will manage the project and coordinate the various
parties involved. The project company will be responsible for the construction, financing,
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output and performance of the plant. The government's sole responsibility is to purchase
the output of the plant via EDL and provide some guarantees and incentives that would
attract investors to Lebanon to undertake such a project. The revenues of the plant will
enable the project company to repay its debt and generate some profit for the
shareholders. After a predetermined period (about 10-20 years), the project company
should have repaid its debt and equity, and will transfer the plant ownership to the
government (at no fee).
The success of such a project in Lebanon will depend on many factors. Each of
these factors will be discussed in the following sections. Based on information about
Lebanon and lessons learned from other BOT projects in developing countries, a
framework will be established to suit Lebanon's needs.
3. BOO Vs. BOT 4
Since Build-Operate-Own (BOO) and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) are
becoming increasingly popular financing techniques for infrastructure projects, either
could be considered for financing the Lebanese Power Generation Project. The two major
issues regarding the application of one of these schemes over the other are the financial
implications behind these techniques, and the political standpoint of the local government
and its commitment to full privatization. This section will only depict the financial
determinants of selection between BOO and BOT.
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We ought to consider two main frameworks in the decision-making process: the
conceptual framework and the negotiation framework.
1. The Conceptual Framework
BOO and BOT, two capital budgeting processes, should be well understood by the
government as well as the sponsoring consortium in order to facilitate the negotiation
process. Several lessons learned pointed out that the most common cause of lengthy
negotiation was attributed to the lack of understanding of the financial implications of each
(negotiation) option, by the government on one hand, and the project consortium on the
other (refer to the Hub River case in Chapter 3).
The following equation depicts the relationship between the initial investment and
the stream of future cash flows until the end of the life of the project:
IO = [ACFt / (+IRR*) t] + TVn / (I+IRR*)"
Where: IO = Initial Outlay / Investment,
ACF = Annual Cash Flows,
T = Number of years of project's economic life (without transfer),
IRR* = Target Internal Rate of Return representing minimum acceptable hurdle
rate,
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TV = Transfer Value, which equals the sum of all foregone cash flows after the
transfer at year n,
and n = The year the transfer takes place if the project is a BOT-type project.
The acceptability of the project is determined by its internal rate of return, defined as the
discount rate equating the present value of all future cash flows (ACFt), including the
transfer value at time n (TVn), to the initial investment. Since BOO does not involve
transfer of the plant at the end of the predetermined period, the transfer value belongs to
the project company and is included in the target IRR calculation (as shown in the
formula).
Since a BOT project requires the transfer of the plant at some point (n), the
transfer value should be excluded from the IRR calculation. Therefore the cash flows
which result after the transfer year will not belong to the project company but to the
government instead. Thus, these cash flows represent the opportunity cost for the
consortium. In order to maintain the same rate of return, the initial investment must be
reduced by the amount shown below:
IO - [TVn / (I+IRR*)n] = E[ACFt /(I+IRR*) t]
The sooner the transfer takes place, the larger is the transfer value, knowing that the
sponsor will have to sacrifice more ACFs, and the lower the initial outlay becomes to
maintain the target IRR*. Smaller initial outlay implies a reduction in capacity of the plant,
or in the cost of the project. Usually neither option is acceptable to the government
because of the need for a certain size and technology. The only option left to maintain the
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target IRR* is to increase the annual cash flows. From the project company standpoint,
the annual cash flows (ACFt) can be increased by inflating the tariff and/or by decreasing
some of the costs.
The major issue being advanced against BOT in favor of BOO is the fact that with
BOT, the sponsors tend to rely on strict measures to cut costs, such as lower maintenance,
(which reflects a sub-optimal maintenance schedule in order to maintain its target IRR*).
The outcome of such a poor maintenance schedule is that at the transfer point, the plant is
in a poor shape and the government will have to spend a great deal of money to
rehabilitate it, which adds to the total actual costs of the facility. This explains why BOT
costs more than BOO to the government in the final analysis.
A second argument against BOT is the lack of commitment of the sponsor to the
investment, specifically in the case where the operation period is short (10 years instead of
30 years). This lack of commitment results in less attention to issues such as training and
human resource development. As a consequence, there are fewer possible opportunities
for personnel improvements than there would be under a BOO option. This lack of
commitment would also lower the operating cost and therefore increase the ACF and IRR.
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2. The Negotiation Framework
A. The Abandonment Framework:
At this stage, we can conclude that from the financial standpoint BOO appears to
be the preferred method. However, for the case of Lebanon, the government has political
constraints and therefore prefers BOT. Then, the basic financial foundation behind
decision making should be the indifference principle between various options of transfer
timing. From the sponsor's perspective, a transfer at no cost can be acceptable if it is
considered an abandonment case in the capital budgeting process where there is no
salvage value. Such abandonment can be viewed by the sponsors as a cost saving move
which would make the net present value (NPV) positive, and therefore more acceptable.
The Government of Lebanon must be aware of these intricacies in order to come up with a
negotiable proposal and execute it effectively.
In the case of Lebanon, since BOT is imperative, one option the government can
propose (based on the abandonment concept), which may be acceptable to the sponsors, is
to make the transfer at a cost which equals the estimated salvage value. This transaction
should be coupled with the option to renew the concession, given that everything is
satisfactory to both parties by the time of the transfer.
The abandonment framework for negotiation would allow the initial investment to
be acceptable to the government, which would result in time saved during negotiations
since there are fewer items to negotiate. Without transfer cost, the sponsor would have to
require many other concessions, which will be discussed in the following section.
B. The Concessionary Framework:
In the case of a BOT project, if abandonment is not an option, then concessions
ought to be made. As indicated earlier, the targeted IRR is maintained by increasing the
annual cash flows. These cash flows can be increased by altering the tariff and/or the cost
involved in the process.
The items which are often highlighted during the negotiation phase have been
maintenance, training and human resource development costs. Due to the aging of the
equipment and the increase in maintenance needed to assure satisfactory production, the
repair and maintenance costs normally increase with the project life.
Another cost item which should be thoroughly negotiated is the training and
human resource development cost. Examples of training include maintenance training,
monitoring equipment training, engineering training for construction supervision,
administration training and project management. The training must be emphasized in
Lebanon in order to allow transfer of both technical and managerial expertise.
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Both BOT and BOO are new financing techniques for infrastructure project
development. Both are still relatively new and tend to be less understood in developing
countries, where differences between the two concepts are not easily discerned, and where
the application of capital budgeting techniques has not reached an appropriate level.
Consequently, the negotiation phase of BOT/BOO is usually lengthy, resulting in cost
increases and, in some cases, the abandonment of the project. In order to increase the
speed and success of such negotiations in Lebanon, it is suggested that priorities be set.
These priorities must be concurrent with the overall government recovery strategy and
must suit the socioeconomic situation of the country. As the government is not yet
dedicated to full privatization schemes, a BOT process is more suitable for the immediate
future. Finally, it is suggested that, in order to speed up the negotiation process, financial
analysis must be used to determine the exact impacts of the concession. In this case, the
negotiation would become more factual and the implications of negative political
interventions more predictable, and thus more easily controlled.
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B. Financial Analysis
This section focuses on an initial analysis of the Lebanese Power Generation
Project based on general assumptions provided by the World Bank. Such analyses must
always be conducted before such projects in order to identify the viability and the details
of every item in the cash flow. These analyses will determine the attractiveness of the
project to debt lenders, equity investors and multilateral agencies. Furthermore, sensitivity
analyses will predict the project cash flow under potentially changing conditions.
1. Financial Requirements of the Lenderss
In evaluating the project for the purposes of limited recourse financing, lenders will
need to be assured that the project is viable under justifiable assumptions and after
appropriate sensitivity analyses of the cashflows. The project needs to generate sufficient
revenues to meet its cash costs (including debt services), and maintaining a margin to
cover negative conditions. Two measures are used to assess the adequacy of projected
cashflows. These measures are the debt service ratio and the coverage ratio. The debt
ratio is defined as the annual cash flow available for debt service divided by the value of
the debt service. The coverage ratio is the NPV of cash flows incurred during operation
life divided by the outstanding loan.
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If the value of the coverage ratio is equal to one, then the debt could be repaid if
the future cash flow matches its projected value. However, this leaves the project with no
margin for errors. A coverage ratio of less than one means that the debt could not be
repaid with the given cash flows. A coverage ratio in excess of one provides room for
variations from the cash flows projections. We suggest that in the case of Lebanon, since
this project will be a pioneer in BOT financing, it is highly advisable that the coverage
ratio be well above one in order to leave room for experience curve effects and the
unpredictability of the economic environment.
2. Financial Requirements of Equity Investors5
In addition to the lenders' concerns, the equity investors' concern will be the adequacy of
project financial returns. Equity investors use the following criteria to evaluate project
attractiveness:
1. IRR on equity investment
2. Payback period
3. Risks to net cash flows
In the case of Lebanon, investors will look for a short payback period (3-5 years
from project startup). This is due to the current political instability of the region. Investors
will also review the sensitivity of cash flows to the variations in pricing, capital
expenditures, production rates etc.
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3. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis of such a project will depend on how the risks are shared, and
this can only be determined once advanced negotiations start taking place. Sensitivity
analyses are usually undertaken for:
1. Project capital cost
2. Selling price of power




7. Effect of inflation
8. Combinations of the above
The projected value of any of the factors mentioned above must be altered unfavorably,
and the viability of the project should be reassessed. If the project cash flow can still
absorb these risks, then the project will be more attractive to all lenders and investors.
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4. Project Viability
In order to better understand the general attractiveness of the project, the
following questions must be raised6:
Revenue Stream:
1. Can a specific revenue stream be identified, assured and written into a binding
contract? (i.e. Does a market existfor the product or service?) If the revenue can not be
contractually assured, is it predictable over a reasonably long period?
The BOT plant will sell all of its output to EDL. The power tariff will be negotiated ahead
of time. The contract will either bind EDL to a minimum monthly amount of power or will
pay for the underusage of the plant (refer to Power Tariff section). Since the electricity
demand in Lebanon is much higher than the current supply, it is expected that EDL will
purchase all of the plant's capacity.
2. Are the revenues coning from a creditworthy source? If not, can the pelfornmance of
the revenue source be secured?
Even though the power purchaser, EDL, had financial difficulties during the war, the
Government of Lebanon would have to guarantee EDL's payments. It is also assumed that
EDL will improve the problem of bills collection and power theft. Therefore EDL's
financial situation would be ameliorated once it concentrates on transmission and
distribution.
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3. How is the revenue stream structured to accommodate inflation, increasing project
expenses ...etc. ?
It is assumed that inflation prone components of the power tariff will be indexed according
to an international independent agencys publications. However, the operations and
maintenance contractor will guarantee unforeseen project variable expenses.
Operating Expenses:
1. How well can project operating expenses be forecasted? Are project operations and
expenses low-risk? Can operating expenses be insured?
Since it is suggested that the technology used in the plant be proven and reliable, its
operating expenses should be easily forecasted. An experienced contractor would already
be familiar with causes of increased costs and would know how to forecast accurately.
Nevertheless, the O&M contractor should guarantee the operations costs. It is also
assumed that the O&M contractor would be insured.
2. Who will take the risk of increasing operating expenses?
The O&M contractor will assume all the risk for an increase in the operating expenses, in




Will the facility have a value remaining at the end of the franchise period which can be
transferred back to the government or will it be obsolete or have outlived its life?
Since the project is undertaken on a BOT basis, it should be transferable. The concession
period should be shorter than the life of the plant. The Lebanese Government needs to
make sure that it is a viable "transfer."
Financing
1. What kind of financing would be required to amortize the cost of the project and
provide a reasonable and competitive return to the equity investor?
The project is defined on a limited-recourse financing, relying on the project cash flows
and risks. A thorough financial analysis is assumed to have taken place.
2. Can the debt market provide the funds for financing the project? Is the project too
large? Can it be broken into smaller segments or done in stages?
The local debt market is not large enough to absorb such a project, however, the
international debt market could close the gap, especially if the World Bank assists in
financing the project. The project is financially large compared to the other projects
currently taking place in Lebanon. It is possible to break the project into smaller parts,
however, the country needs a project of this size in order to meet the large unsatisfied
demand.
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3. What kind of security would have to be given by the project company and/or its
shareholders during the construction and operations period to obtain the financing
required?
The performance bond and the cost overrun insurance are the responsibility of the
contractor. In typical case scenarios, the international contractors approach the host
government along with their export agencies, which insure their performance.
Objectives
What are the objectives of the government in pursuing this project?
a. Scarce countryfunds (local andforeign)
b. Technology transfer
c. Creation of new jobs, country investment
d. Promote competition
The Lebanese Government is constrained by its borrowing capacity. Thus, it is to its
advantage to enter into a partnership with a reliable sponsor. This sponsor should bring a
level of technology and management skills, which ought to be transferred to EDL at the
end of the concession. This project will help create new jobs, a positive externality.
However, the nature of the project is to assist EDL in supplying the needed electricity and
not compete with it. The plant will only be allowed to sell power to EDL.
Regulatory
What kind ofperformance will be required by the private sector developer?
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The private sector developer will be required to build a plant according to the agreed
specifications. The penalty will be amortized by a performance bond and the quality will be
assured by an independent quality consultant.
149
C. Project Financing
BOT projects can be considered a variant of limited-recourse financing. The
limited recourse financing is based on the fact that project risks and cash flows, in which
guarantees given from project owners, are limited. The potential benefits of such a type of
financing include freeing potential borrowing capacity of the government, sharing project
risks, and bringing private sector efficiency and commercial discipline to the power
development process.
As we mentioned in previous sections of this thesis, BOT financing schemes
require a detailed risk analysis in order to assess whether all the risks will be satisfactorily
covered: First, the economic analysis is used to demonstrate acceptable rates of return to
the government and the project; and second, financial analysis is used to demonstrate
adequate cash flows (refer to Chapter 2 of this thesis). It is thus a complex process which
involves the reconciliation, within a defined time period and at an acceptable overall cost,
of the conflicting variables, and the requirements in order to meet the objectives of
lenders, governments, investors, contractors, suppliers of raw materials, and finally,
purchasers of output.
The benefits of limited recourse financing have a price. The BOT structure of a
project will incur some costs otherwise not present in government bids. These are the
costs of financing, insurance and time spent on negotiation. However these costs are
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recuperated by the efficient management of the private sector. Some drawbacks of limited
recourse financing projects include lengthy projects' development process7 . Nevertheless,
tighter construction and planning under private sponsorship can reduce the delay in
development. The private sector is constrained in its ability to allocate funds and operate
without external review. The government will also be constrained in its ability to change
the business environment for the project in question7 .
In the 1970s and early 1980s, such an infrastructure project would have been done
entirely in the public sector, with the involvement of the World Bank and other bilateral
institutions, and probably export credits guarantees by suppliers' governments as well.
Nowadays, in the present financial environment, at least half the resources might be
leveraged from sources outside of the country.
The following are the steps which, once integrated effectively, represent the
development of a viable BOT project 7. The first step consists of the clarification of the
host government's objectives and constraints, including financial constraints. This stage
includes preliminary evaluation studies. The principal operating partner should be
identified and initial negotiations completed on technical, commercial and financial issues.
The second step involves the developing of contractual arrangements. Other equity
investors must be identified. At this time, detailed engineering studies are completed, a
financing strategy is planned, and lenders and contractors secured. Finally, the rest of the
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documents describing the contract and the loans are completed. This process usually takes
about two to three years.
Financing such a project will require the involvement of a substantial number of
parties. The financing can be arranged in multiple ways, using a portfolio of many
available financial instruments. Since such a project has not yet been undertaken in
Lebanon, it is difficult to predict its financial structure. In the following sections, the
authors will try to depict a financial structure and sources of finance that match the
economical environment of Lebanon. Such a structure will be devised on the likely
available sources of finance, and on norms acceptable to the business community, banks
and Government of Lebanon.
1. Equity 8
The equity of a project represents the initial capital put forward in order to attract
senior forms of capital. As compared to debt lenders, equity lenders are the last to be
repaid from the profits generated by the cash flow. In addition, in case the project is not
successful and its assets liquidated, the equity lenders are given the last priority in the
distribution of the proceeds. The advantages of equity include the relatively high profits
they generate if the project is successful. On the other hand, debt lenders get a fixed return
on their investments regardless of the cashflow's performance.
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There are two main reasons for requiring a certain level of equity in a project. The
first is that senior debt lenders use equity as safety margin, should the project not perform
as well as predicted. Once equity is available, the debt lenders will be more comfortable
with investing in the project. The other reason is that a significant portion of equity is
provided by the host government and the project sponsor. These two parties are the most
critical players for the success of the project. The financial involvement (through equity
investments) of these two parties will assure the lenders of their commitment, since they
have a vested interest in the prevailing performance of the project.
For this case in Lebanon, the project's equity percentage ought to be high. This is
due to several reasons:
· Lebanon is viewed as a high risk country due to its political instability. The debt
lenders are unwilling to finance a highly leveraged project in a risky country. A high
equity percentage leaves enough safety margin for unpredictable events.
* It will increase the involvement of the Lebanese government. The involved parties fear
the passiveness of the highly bureaucratized local government. A large financial
involvement of the government in the equity investment will invoke its attention and
will encourage it to facilitate the execution of the project. Nevertheless, it is
undesirable that the government be too involved in such a project since it will reduce
the efficiency of the private sector by limiting its freedom; this will contradict the basis
of the BOT principle.
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* It will increase the involvement of the project sponsor. The sponsor will have a higher
interest in the project, which goes beyond construction, and management fees.
The sources of equity for such a project in Lebanon are limited. On the
international scope, the foreign sponsor is the main supplier of equity. Sometimes he can
be accompanied by a foreign joint venture partner and a private sector window. The
private sector window, such as the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank,
will demonstrate its approval of the project by investing in equity. Such a move will
encourage other foreign investors to consider Lebanon as a prospective ground for future
investments.
On the local level, the Government of Lebanon should be the main equity provider.
Some local equity can be provided by a local joint venture partner and mutual funds. The
local partner will probably be financially restrained due to its size (Lebanese firms tend to
be small); therefore, he will have a nominal share in overall equity. The local mutual funds
could be a good source of private Lebanese funds. However, the strength of mutual fimds
will depend on the future of capital and money markets in Lebanon. The initial success of
Beirut's private real estate company, SOLIDERE, demonstrates the willingness of the
public to participate in the reconstruction of Lebanon. Also, mutual funds will be a
gateway for the Lebanese Diaspora to invest locally. The issue of a preferred stock for the
proposed BOT plant will be an incentive for the Lebanese public to participate in equity
financing.
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Other components of the financial package, such as subordinated loans, can be
used to increase the percentage of equity while maintaining a fixed income structure.
2. Subordinated Loanss
Subordinated loans are fixed-rate, long-term and unsecured loans. They are used
to increase the percentage of equity since they can be considered part of equity. This is
due to the fact that subordinated loans are used to secure senior debt. They can be used to
finance initial costs such as construction. Once subordinated loans are secured and are able
to cover a certain portion of costs, the senior debt lenders would be more reassured. The
advantages of subordinated loans are numerous:
1. They return a steady income, which does not depend on the performance of the
company.
2. If the performance of the company is satisfactory, the subordinated loans can be
converted, for a premium, to equity.
3. There is a larger market for subordinated loans than for risk equity.
4. Subordinated loans allow an investor to bypass Anti-Trust Laws if he wishes to buy
the majority of the project.
Such loans can be obtained from local commercial banks in Lebanon. The latter are
not usually willing to invest in projects for a long term, and would invest in subordinated
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loans which can later be converted to equity and sold. They can be used by the local
authorities to promote the project and encourage senior lenders to provide long-term debt.
A subordinated loan is considered to be a median between equity and senior debt.
In terms of priority payments, it is considered senior to equity capital and junior to senior
debt.
3. Senior Debt8
Senior debt usually constitutes more than 50% of the total financing of
infrastructure projects. These debts are not subordinated and their service is given the first
priority in distributing the operating profits of the project. Debts come in two forms.
secured and unsecured. Unsecured debt is backed by the general credit of the borrower
and is not guaranteed by a third party. Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the lender
and the borrower in an unsecured debt obligation. The process starts by a loan agreement
between the two parties. The lender secures the debt amount to the borrower.
Consequently, the borrower pays the debt service periodically to the lender.
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Figure 6: Unsecured Debt Obligation.
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Secured debt involves the guarantee of a third party often referred to as a security
trustee. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the three involved parties. Afer the loan
agreement is reached between the lender and the borrower, a security agreement is
reached between the borrower and a security trustee. The latter takes the debt service
from the borrower and delivers it to the lender.
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Figure 7: Secured Debt Obligation.
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Before financing such a BOT project, senior lenders would have some of the
following concerns:
1. The project's total financing must be secured before the final agreements are complete.
The lenders do not want to risk leaving some financing unsecured, since new financing
sources might impose different conditions and could threaten the overall performance
of the project.
2. All senior lenders must be equal in ranking. If a problem arises, no senior lender should
be given preference over others.
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3. The senior loan agreements should include cross-default clauses. This is to prevent the
default on one loan to trigger defaults on the rest of the loans.
4. All payments to senior lenders must be proportional to the ratio of their initial loan on
the project.
5. If the project underperforms, and decisions have to be made as to the future outlook
of the venture or the capital structure will have to be changed, the senior lenders have
to agree by majority vote on the course of action to take.
For the Lebanese power generation plant, there are numerous sources of senior
debt:
· Foreign Commercial Banks. These banks have been reluctant to lend Lebanon since it
is an LDC with a high country risk. They are willing to lend to the private sector with
a guarantee from an export credit agency.
* Export Credit Agencies. The sponsor's country of origin should be willing to provide
debt to the project if it can promote its exports in Lebanon. Export credit agencies
have some advantages that apply to the power generation case of Lebanon:
1. Debt is available at a fixed rate of interest.
2. That rate is lower than rates offered by commercial banks.
3. The loan period is usually longer than the one offered by commercial
banks.
4. Increased protection against the Lebanese government expropriation of
the facility, since a foreign government is involved.
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Nevertheless, export financing has its disadvantages:
1. Long waiting periods before obtaining approval.
2. The equipment available from the same country providing export finance
might not be optimal for the project.
· Private Sector Windows. These should provide the project with around 20% of the
total cost. Their involvement encompasses many advantages. They offer low interest
loans for longer terms. They also add to the credibility of the project.
· Arab Funds. Other Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries, have historically
provided financing to projects in Lebanon. These take the form of "soft loans" which
are very low interest loans that are sometimes forgiven. The sources for these loans
include the Kuwait Fund, Saudi Fund and the Arab Monetary Fund. These Arab
sources of debt have renewed their interest in investing in Lebanon. This has been
demonstrated with the oversubscription of SOLIDERE by $300 million. The excess
funds were to be returned to the Gulf investors. Instead, they can be re-invested in
Lebanon. An option would be to use the money as debt for the BOT plant. Appendix
II shows some of the available financing through such sources.
* Local Commercial Banks. The Government of Lebanon can guarantee loans from local
commercial banks. These loans would otherwise have high interest rates, and be
provided on short term basis.
* The Government of Lebanon can use some of its reconstruction funds to provide
subordinated loans for the project. The availability of subordinated loans will
encourage international senior debt.
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4. Financial Structure
Although such a project in Lebanon could have a multitude of different financial
arrangements, the authors will depict some likely ranges of investment of each involved
lender. There are many factors that can influence the debt-equity ratio for such a project.
Among these factors are the market expectations, the risks involved, the government
incentives and cooperation, the future state of the economy and the past experience of
lenders in Lebanon. The authors suggest an equity percentage no less than 25% of the
total financing. The basis for such an estimate is the lessons learned from the other power
generation plants in developing countries. Table 16 shows the likely contributions of each
equity lender for the power plant in Lebanon. Table 17 shows the likely contributions of
each debt lender.
Table 16: Possible Equity Contributions.
Type of Loan Source Probable Range
Equity Project Sponsor 10%- 15%
Public Sale of Securities (Mutual Funds, 0% - 10%
Convertible Bonds, Stocks etc.)
Private Sector Windows (IFC, MIGA, World Bank 5%- 10%
etc.)
Government of Lebanon 5% - 10%
TOTAL 25%- 30%
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Table 17: Possible Debt Contributions.
Type of Loan Source Probable Range
Debt Arab Funds 25% - 40%
Private Sector Windows (IFC, MIGA, World Bank 5%- 15%
etc.)
Export Credit Agencies 5%- 10%
Local Commercial Banks 0% - 10%
Government of Lebanon 5% - 15%
TOTAL 70%- 75%
5. Escrow Account 9
The Escrow Account is considered an indispensable guarantee needed in every
BOT-type project. It is usually required by the lenders and investors to insure the proper
management of the project's cashflow. An Escrow Account consists of an off-shore
account managed by an escrow agent. All the project revenues are immediately transferred
to the Escrow Account. The latter will control the collection, management and
disbursement of the project's revenues into several other accounts, namely, the operator,
senior lenders, subordinated loans, reserve account and finally, the investors. The highest
priority is given to the operator to cover the O&M costs (including fuel). The second
priority is given to service the debt of the senior lenders. The third priority is to serve
other debt. The left-over cash will be repatriated to the investors in form of dividends.
Figure 8 depicts this process.
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Figure 8: Escrow Account Cash Flow.
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The role of the escrow agent is to hold project security on behalf of all lenders. It
presents the Lebanese pound equivalent in debt reserve to the Central Bank of Lebanon
for conversion to debt service currencies. The Escrow Account will also monitor the
insurance package and authorize disbursement from the insurance account. The agent's
role should become effective at financial close and should remain enforced until all lenders
are repaid.
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Such an account is necessary for the power generation project in Lebanon. This is
due to the potential disputes that might occur over the life of the concession. The lenders
will feel assured if the funds are managed in a Western country by trusted bankers.
6. Reserve Account' °
The Reserve Account is a part of the sponsor's capital. Its purpose is to repay the
operating charges and the debt service if the revenues from the operations are not enough
to do so. The balance of this account is set by the lenders at the time of the financial close.
During the operation phase excess cash is used to meet the required balance in the reserve
account; and meeting the account's minimum balance is given a priority over the
distribution of dividends.
7. Stand-By Credit Facility'°
The stand-by credit facility is a loan set aside for the payment of unforecasted costs
the project might require. Since the initial loans do not cover the extra costs, the stand-by
credit facility is used if the reserve account does not hold the required cash. This credit
facility is usually provided by the debt lenders.
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8. Cash Flows
The project's cash flows will differ between the construction and the operation
phases. In the construction phase, the initial source of capital is equity. Once the equity is
exhausted, the debt is used to finance the rest of the construction. This flux of capital
flows via the Escrow Account to the project company. Figure 9 portrays the cash flow
during construction.
Figure 9: Project Cash Flows During Construction of Plant.
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During the operation phase, the source of capital is EDL, the sole purchaser of the




the concerned parties. (the reader is referred to Figure 8). Figure 10 delineates the cash
flow during the operation phase.
Figure 10: Cash Flows During Operation of Plant.
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9. Legal Framework"
The following provisions set the legal ground required for the implementation of
the BOT Power Plant in Lebanon.
1. A Protocol between the Lebanese government and the project sponsor should
establish the main agreements between the parties.
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2. An implementation agreement between the project sponsor, the O&M
contractor, and the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electrical Resources, will be the
covenant agreed upon for the construction and operation of the project.
3. An Energy Purchase Agreement between EDL and the project company.
4. A construction contract between the project company and the construction
consortium
5. A Subordinated Loan Agreement between the project company and the
Government of Lebanon which ought to be represented by its Central Bank.
6. An Escrow Agreement between EDL, the project company, the investors and
the escrow agent. The latter should be a reputed international bank.
Figure 11 depicts the contractual structure needed for a BOT project in Lebanon.
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Negotiating a BOT contract is a complex, time consuming and costly procedure to
both the host government and the interested sponsor. Sponsors would be willing to spend
years and large amounts of money only if the process is orderly and the chances for
success, and thus the recovery of the investments, are predictable. In order to attract
private sponsors to develop proposals for projects in Lebanon, the Lebanese Government
should start by commissioning a study on the prospective project. This was already done
in 1992 when the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) hired two
renowned international consultants to plan the emergency reconstruction for Lebanon's
recovery. Such feasibility studies will demonstrate the seriousness of the Lebanese
Government in starting a series of BOT-type projects. Usually governments either accept
one unsolicited proposal or start a competitive bid process.
Unsolicited proposals by only one sponsor, seem to be attractive to the host
government since they are a short cut around the lengthy negotiations and comparisons
between different sponsors. However, this approach is inadvisable to Lebanon's case,
since it could be politically dangerous and economically unwise to accept a proposal from
a single source without evaluating competitive alternatives. If an unsolicited proposal is
imperative, the Lebanese Government should, as a rule of thumb, use EDL to evaluate the
cost and competitiveness of the proposal' 2. The reason behind this is EDL's experience in
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the construction of such projects which are undertaken on a competitive basis.
Nevertheless, some form of competitive selection should be adopted, even if only on the
proposal level, is highly preferable.
If the Lebanese Government is willing to accept unsolicited proposals, the
following steps must be taken3:
1. The government should subject all applications to a processing fee; this fee should be
in the order of $5,000.
2. If the proposal is found to be technically and financially viable, a Letter of Interest
should be issued to the sponsors of the project. Within a predetermined period of the
receipt of this letter (six weeks?), the applicant should be requested to furnish a
performance guarantee. The latter can be a form of a bank guarantee from a local bank
or a reputed international bank, valid for one year (or more). The amount of this
guarantee must be specified to a certain number of US Dollars (a fraction of the
project's costs?). If the guarantee is not furnished on time, the Letter of Interest will
expire.
3. Once the performance guarantee is accepted, a Letter of Support will be issued to the
sponsors.
4. The guarantee will be cashed if the sponsor is not able to achieve financial close within
a certain period (one year?) of the issuance of the Letter of Support.
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Such a scheme will encourage applications only from very serious and financially viable
sponsors, without wasting the efforts the Lebanese Government in trying to negotiate with
technically or financially underqualified sponsors.
The preferred procedure for awarding BOT projects should be similar to that for
awarding public construction projects. The host government should start by identifying the
project it wishes to undertake on a BOT basis and should define the expected standard of
the product 2. The next step consists of providing a list of incentives and government
support to the awarded sponsors'2. This list should include the power tariff calculation
method, the required debt-equity ratio, host government debt or equity financing available.
At this point, the Government of Lebanon should receive preliminary proposals from
interested sponsors. The most suitable sponsor should then be selected on the basis of
criteria that are of importance to the Lebanese Government. These criteria could include
price, experience, length of concession period, and other benefits such as technology
transfer etc.. Then, the complex and detailed negotiations will proceed to the finalizing of
financing and other agreements amongst the involved parties.
Since the host government has a vested interest in getting a low price, it is tempted
not to preserve the integrity of the competitive bidding process'2. The government might
continue to shop initial bids until it is certain it has achieved the best possible price for the
project in question. However, the government could fall into the trap of allowing retenders
and therefore lose its credibility. This could lead to very high initial bids on subsequent
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projects because the bidders would know that they will be given a chance to lower their
prices later on in the process. Also, some sponsors will no longer seek participation in a
bidding process that would lack credibility. Unfortunately, the Government of Lebanon
has historically engaged in bid cancellation, over-extended negotiations and retenders. The
government would have to prove its seriousness in order to attract international
contenders to the project, since, at the present, some multinational firms do not view
Lebanon as a priority area to work in 3.
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E. Construction of Plant
During the proposal phase of the project, the sponsors will seek a construction
consortium to undertake the construction of the plant. The construction consortium will
include many parties usually under the responsibility of the general contractor. These
parties are design contractors, foundation contractors, electromechanical contractors,
generation equipment suppliers and civil contractors. A generation plant usually includes
the generation equipment, fuel supply tanks, office and control space, and living quarters
for staff.
1. Choice of Technology
There are several power generation technologies. Some of these include
hydroelectric, gas powered and coal powered technologies. Before the negotiations, the
Ministry of Hydraulic and Electrical Resources must identify the technologies that are
clearly not feasible or needed in Lebanon. Hydroelectric power, for example, is not a
suitable option due to the lack of unexploited river locations in Lebanon. Also.,
hydroelectric projects require longer payback periods than other technologies, and finding
lenders for a such long term could be difficult.
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Another very important factor influencing the choice of technology must be the
reliability of that technology. The technology chosen must not be '"new" or emerging. The
Government of Lebanon should not experiment with such an important sector of the
infrastructure. The technology proposed must be proven to be reliable and successfully
implemented on other projects in the past. Also, the lenders will be skeptical of a project
involving a new technology.
The Lebanese authorities negotiating the contract should stress environmentally
sound technologies. If an environmentally damaging technology is implemented, it could
leave the government with a large clean-up cost after the life of the project. By then, the
contractors would have transferred the plant to the government and would not be liable
for the effects of such pollution. Although the Ministry of Environment in Lebanon is not
yet enforcing environmental protection, such a project must not be overlooked since its
effects will only be apparent years after its transfer to the Lebanese Authorities. One good
way to ensure that a technology is environmentally safe, is to have the World Bank or
UNDP approve the contractor's proposal.
Another criterion important to the choice of technology for the project is the life of
the plant after its transfer to the Government of Lebanon. It is useless to undertake a BOT
project if the plant will have outlived its life by the end of the concession period. The
Lebanese authorities must make sure that the transfer at the end of the project life is a
viable one.
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One important lesson learned from projects in countries similar to Lebanon is that
the government should not give specific project specifications. The contractor/designer
must have the flexibility to optimize the technology and scope of the project to make sure
that he undertakes projects that he is experienced in. If the specifications are set in a strict
way, the contractor might build a plant that he is inexperienced in building. The contractor
is more likely to be informed of the ideal technology and project scope than the
government. The Lebanese Authorities should negotiate standards of the output of the
plant and not the capital costs. All the design and cost intricacies should be left to the
project company. This will allow the contractor to use his expertise to propose a lower-
cost, more efficient design.
2. Choice of Construction Consortium
When the Council for Development and Reconstruction announced the tender for
the Beirut International Airport, many multinational construction consortia bid for the
project. This proves that if a BOT project for a power plant were to be offered, the most
experienced multinationals would be interested in undertaking it. The Lebanese authorities
would have a variety of contractors to choose from. At this point it is important to
prequalify only the syndicate of contractors that satisfy the following conditions:
The consortium is willing to undertake the construction on a turnkey basis. This
condition will leave both the design and implementation risk to the contractor and
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allow conflicts to be more easily resolved (since any underperformance in the
construction phase can be blamed on the consortium). The turnkey contract will have a
fixed price, fixed completion date, and agreed-upon quality, with the construction
consortium taking the time and cost overrun risks.
* All the members of the consortium have successfully completed a plant using the same
technology. It is important to emphasize that all the involved parties (design team,
contractor and equipment supplier) have worked together on a previous project
involving the same technology that they propose. This point is crucial since the
Lebanese Authorities should not take the risk of allowing parties to work together on
a first time basis. If they do not agree on specifications or do not work efficiently
together the risk of construction not being completed successfully and ontime will
increase drastically.
* The consortium is large and financially sound enough to undertake such a project.
* The consortium is willing to take the construction risks and provide a performance
bond whose value is approximately equal to 10% of the value of the contract.
The construction consortium should provide financing and a large amount of
equity. Based on the different proposals and packages offered by the different contractors,
the Lebanese Government will choose one which optimizes cost, transfer period and
output.
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3. Monitoring and Supervision
Once the construction begins, the project company must appoint a team of
engineers to supervise the construction of the plant. Another alternative would be to hire
an international consultant to monitor the construction process. The contractor must
submit specific data on the status of the project on a monthly basis. The project supervisor
can then compare the statement of progress to the statement of expenditure. All the data
can be entered into a monthly report that is submitted to the project company and the
Government of Lebanon. If major problems occur, an impact study can be conducted and
alteration can be undertaken 9. Figure 12 depicts the project supervision process.
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Figure 12: Project Supervision Process.


































F. Operations and Maintenance
One of the most difficult tasks in a BOT project, is to assure the proper operation
of the plant. This is due to the important effect the operations have on the return of the
project. In the case of non-satisfactory operations, the project will not yield the desired
revenues or will not sustain acceptable operating costs. Either outcome will result in
financial inadequacy, and the project could be considered a failure. Another aspect that
increases the difficulty of this task is the amount of time (the project's life) over which the
operator's performance will have to be sustained.
Since the operations and maintenance contractor is one of the most significant
members of the project company, the sponsors must be very careful in their selection
process. It is imperative that the O&M contractor have a similar experience in power
generation BOT projects and preferably ones with similar output to that proposed in
Lebanon. The O&M contractor must also have experience with the same type of power
generation equipment. It is also preferable that the O&M contractor be experienced with
projects in the Middle Eastern area.
The responsibility of the O&M includes 9:
1. Planning of the procurement of raw material such as fuel.
2. Proper maintenance of the equipment and timely purchase of spare parts.
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3. Setting up an organizational structure comprised of qualified personnel and their
training.
4. Clear communication with EDL to determine the needed daily amount of power.
5. Reporting to the project sponsors on the exact performance of the plant. Predicting
difficulties before their occurrence.
6. Optimizing and fine tuning the equipment in order to assure maximum efficiency.
The performance of the O&M contractor should be guaranteed by a performance
bond. The performance bond should allow the sponsoring company to have another
operator in case the original operator fails. The contractor must be a large corporation and
have enough financial leverage to deal with a temporary deficiency in its cashflow. This is




Since the power plant will burn fuel to generate electricity, the price of fuel is one
of the main variable costs. A fluctuation in the price of fuel (or gas depending on the type
of plant) could considerably affect the costs, and therefore profitability, of the project. One
of the main concerns of the project company is to secure itself against the fluctuations in
the costs of fuel.
The project company faces three alternatives for contracting the price of fuel. The
first alternative involves securing a fixed long-term agreement with a fuel supplier. This
would hedge the risk of fuel cost fluctuations and the project's cash flow will be more
predictable for the life of the project. Such a contract could be obtained at a high premium
from an international supplier and could cause the project company to pay a high, but
fixed, price for the fuel. A similar contract could be negotiated with Lebanon's Ministry of
Hydraulic and Electrical Resources, where the ministry would provide fuel at a fixed price
(even if subsidized) to the contractor. The Lebanese Government could use this as an
incentive to increase the attractiveness of such a project by decreasing one aspect of the
many risks involved. Unfortunately, due to the many fluctuations in the price of fuel in the
past years, few suppliers are willing to commit to a long-term contract. This is especially
true at the time this thesis was written, when fuel is at its lowest price in many years.
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Another alternative would be to allow the project company to sell the power it
produces at a price proportional to the fluctuations in the price of fuel. The tariff would
have two components, one covering fixed costs of the project company and the other
covering variable operating costs. The second component would include the price of fuel
and would vary with the fluctuations in the price of the former. Such an agreement would
reduce the risks of the project company since it will protect its revenues from fuel price
risk. However, such a scheme will make the project less attractive to the client, EDL,
since EDL would not be able to predict the tariff of power that it buys externally.
Nevertheless, EDL could then transfer this rise in costs to the consumers. These would
view that fluctuations in the price of fuel as affecting their lifestyle, and would not have
the option to purchase electricity at a subsidized tariff.
The last alternative would be to allow the project company to import fuel at
international prices without paying taxes or duties. At the same time EDL would purchase
electricity at a fixed cost throughout the life of the project. This alternative would force
the project sponsors to take a risk with the price of fuel. This would, of course, make the
project less attractive to international investors, but would secure EDL a predictable cash
flow.
The second alternative seems most reasonable to be adopted. The cost of
electricity is always dependent on fuel costs and EDL should pay for it accordingly. If
EDL was producing the electricity and the fuel costs increased, then it would either be
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transferred to the consumer or would have to be subsidized. Since EDL is buying it at
prices concurrent to what it would cost EDL to produce it, it should purchase it at a fair
price.
The fuel agreement is one of the major issues in a BOT project in the power
sector. Since the Government of Lebanon is not in a strong bargaining position against
international contractors, it would have to lessen the risks involved in the project. This
would conclude that EDL would have to purchase power at a tariff that is dependent on
the price of fuel.
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H. Power Tariff Agreement
The power tariff agreement is one of the most important components of the
security package. Since the sole product of the plant is power, the amount of revenues will
depend on the tariff of the power sold to EDL. If properly negotiated, the agreement
could significantly reduce some of the project's risks, therefore comforting the lenders.
There are two suitable alternatives for Lebanon's case. The first is a "take or pay"
agreement. Under such an agreement, EDL will be obligated to pay for a minimum
amount of daily power, whether it uses it or not. If EDL buys more than this minimum
amount, then it would have to pay for it in full. From the project company's point of view,
the value of the minimum daily amount will be critical. If this value does not yield the
predicted revenues then the project is risky, since EDL is not legally obligated to buy more
than that amount. On the other hand, if that minimum value is high enough to generate the
desired cash flow, then this agreement would be risk-free and favorable to the project
company. Usually, in such agreements, the purchaser would have to forewarn the
producer of the amount of power needed. That forewarning period is agreed in the
contract documents. Should the project company be unable to deliver the desired amount
of power, then it would owe EDL the amount of cost of the power.
The other alternative would be to split the power tariff into two components3:
Energy price (EP), and capacity purchase price (CPP). The energy price comprises the
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fuel components and a variable operations & maintenance component. The energy price
would be the variable component of the total power tariff and would vary proportionally
with the amount of MWh sold to EDL.
The CPP is also split into two components 3: Escalable component (EC) and non-
escalable component (NEC). The EC includes the fixed operations and maintenance costs,
the insurance costs, the administrative costs and the return on equity etc.. The magnitude
of this component is fixed in the contract, and it is only adjustable against change
proposed in the energy price by the investors. Once determined at the time of financial
close, this base figure will remain unchanged during the life of the project. This amount
could be indexed if changes in base costs occur. The NEC component covers the debt
servicing charges including payment of principal, interest and other fees to the lender.
Once adjusted at the time of financial close, this component would not be indexed.
Using this second alternative in the agreement, implies that EDL would have to
pay the CPP on a monthly basis regardless of the amount of energy it purchases from the
BOT plant. The energy price would be the marginal charge beyond the CPP and this
charge would be proportional to the amount of energy sold to EDL3. It is important to
note, at this point, that the energy price would decrease per megawatt-hour if a large
amount of power is sold to EDL. This is due to economies of scale. Figure 13 depicts a
typical power tariff structure.
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Figure 13: Power Tariff Structure.
Source: Reference Number 8.
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The advantage of this method is that the sponsoring company is safe from cash
flow risks related to revenues since its expenses would be covered even if EDL's demand
decreases. This contract is advisable if EDL plans to buy large amounts of power from the
plant and if the Government of Lebanon is willing to provide attractive opportunities to
foreign investment.
Another premium would have to be added to the rate of every MWh. This
premium is the foreign exchange risk insurance and it is payable either to the Central Bank
of Lebanon, or to the International Foreign Exchange Risk Insurer. This amount is about
5% ofthe tariff per MWh3.
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If the involved parties decide to index the energy price, then the fuel cost will be
indexed on the basis of changes in fuel prices maintaining the agreed heat rate (thermal
efficiency)3. Also, the variable operation and maintenance cost should be indexed against
exchange rate variations between the Lebanese pound and hard currency and inflation rate
of the country where the spare parts would be imported from Moreover, the indexation
should apply prospectively on a pre-agreed periodic basis (semi-annually?).
Using information taken from similar power generation projects undertaken in
developing countries, a break-up of the percentage of each component of the bulk power
tariff is shown in Table 18. These numbers are by no means exact but can be used by the
reader as a rough guide to the weight of each component in the overall cost of one KWh.
Table 18: Break-up of the Bulk Power Tariff.







Foreign Exchange Risk Insurance 6%
TOTAL 100 %
Source: Reference number 3.
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I. Risk Coverage and Insurance
Before such a project is undertaken in a developing country such as Lebanon, a
thorough analysis of all the risks involved is imperative. During such an analysis, all the
risks must be stated, their likelihood predicted and their coverage defined. Risk coverage
will inflate the price of a project, and the extent of this inflation is proportional to the
participation of the private sector. An early identification of risks and responsible parties
for these risks will save time later on, if a problem materializes.
The following is a list of relevant risks to this BOT power generation project in
Lebanon 7 :
Monetary Risk. Monetary risk considers circumstances in which the host country can
not permit transfer offunds for debt service because of its own economic problems.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. This is due to the free market economy of Lebanon. The
government of Lebanon does not control the flow of money in or out of the country. As
an additional assurance, the contract should include a guarantee by the government that
there will be no restriction on the inflow or outflow of money, whether in local or foreign
currency. Given Lebanon's history as a banking center of the Middle East, this policy is
not likely to change.
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Political Risk. This is the risk that any governmental change of policy would adversely
impact profitability.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Medium The government of Lebanon is currently under much of
the social and economical pressures associated with postwar reconstruction. There are
many issues being debated on the future policies of the government. Due to the
bureaucratic nature of the parliament and to the external political pressures imposed on the
decision-making process, some policies are likely to change. However, the Government
should provide a guarantee that the new policies that negatively affect the project will not
be applied to that specific BOT project. In addition to the government's guarantee, both
foreign commercial lenders and foreign equity investors could seek political risk insurance
from their own export agencies or from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank.
Foreign Exchange Risk. This is the risk that the currency in which the revenues are
incurred (Lebanese Pounds in this case) depreciates compared to a hard currency. This
is unfavorable since the lenders and investors are interested in real gains. Also, spare
parts and fuel, which are imported, would increase and thus increase the operating costs
of the plant.
Likelihood in Lebanon: High. This is due to the history of the value of the Lebanese
Pound. During the war, the pound plunged and has not substantially recovered since. Even
though the currency has been stable for the past two years, there is no assurance of this in
the future. The unstable political environment leaves many doubts on the future economic
conditions. As an incentive to the investors, the Central bank of Lebanon should consider
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providing the project company with a foreign exchange risk insurance. The current
premium rates of this insurance should be included in the power tariff. The insurance
should have a value of approximately 5% of the bulk power of tariff
Inflation Risk. This risk includes the adverse effects of inflation on the costs (mostly
variable) of the project.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Medium. One of the effects of the war was an inflated economy.
Although the country did not experience hyperinflation, the risk of moderate inflation is
present. This is especially true if the recovery will bring about a large influx of money from
the Lebanese Diaspora and other investors. One solution for this risk is to periodically
index the tariff of power. EDL must purchase power at a rate which includes components
that could be indexed according to pre-agreed formulae and indexes.
Availability of Permits and Licenses. This risk includes the probability of timely
obtaining the permits and licenses for the construction and operation of the plant.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. The government should be willing to provide the permits
before the finalization of the contract. Otherwise, the delay in obtaining the required
permits should be paid for by the government.
Risk of Competition. This risk will materialize if the host government will allow a
competitor to the project. The output sold will be lessened and might not be enough to
generate the desired cash flows.
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Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. The government should assure the sponsor that no other
generation plant will be built until all of the capacity of the BOT plant is used and more
supply is needed. i.e. if the total demand is 2000 MW and EDL can only supply 1000 MW
and the BOT plant can only supply 500 MW, then it makes sense to add another power
generation project. However, if the plant is not reaching its total capacity, then the
government should not allow any more power generation projects. Most likely, the
government will have to commission other projects since the demand will increase rapidly
in the future. Also, since the government will provide some of the debt and equity to the
plant, it will have a vested interest to keep the cash flow safe.
Operating Performance Risks. This is the risk that operating costs will prove to be
higher than expected or that unpredictable events will increase costs, such as launch
failure or payloadfailure.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Medium. This depends on the performance and expertise of the
operations and maintenance contractor. Unless this is due to factors beyond the O&M
contractor's control, the risk is covered by the performance bond of the contractor. The
security package would include some warranties concerning the general performance of
the project. These guarantees are provided by the equipment supplier and operating
company.
Market Risk. This is the risk that the product of the plant will not have a substantially
large market, or the market will be more price sensitive than expected.
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Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. This risk is very low in Lebanon given the constant power
shortages and the extremely high demand. As for the price of the power, this will be fixed
by a long-term contract. The government must guarantee EDL's credit for purchase of
power.
Development Risk. This risk includes construction cost and time overruns.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Medium. This risk will be undertaken by the contractor and will
be guaranteed by the performance bond.
Technological Risk. This is the risk that technologies critical to project success either
will not be developed, will require greater than expected spending, or will be patented by
a potential competitor.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. This is due to the choice of a suitable technology. One of
the conditions is that the technology should not be "new" or under experiment. The
sponsor will be able to accurately predict the requirements of a technology it has already
tried.
Completion Risk. This is the risk that the project will not end on time, for the price
stated.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Medium. Similar to other developing countries, construction costs
and timing are difficult to predict due to the lack of information and unexpected delays.
However, the consortium undertaking the plant's construction must include an experienced
192
local contractor, who would help accurately predict delays and cost overruns. This risk is
guaranteed by the performance bond of the contractor. As a consequence, the cost of the
project is increased in order to compensate the contractor for taking such a risk.
Enforceability of Contracts Risk. This risk includes the enforceability of the power
purchase agreements and the fuel agreements. Sometimes the parties involved might be
unreliable and not live up to contract obligations in a timely fashion.
Likelihood ill Lebanon: Medium. The power will be purchased by EDL. EDL is currently
facing financial difficulties and its credit for payments is questionable. One solution to this
problem is to have the Lebanese Government guarantee EDL's payments. If EDL is unable
to comply with its financial obligations, then the Government will pay the sponsor for the
energy produced.
Price of Raw Materials and Fuel Risk. This risk comprises the escalation of the prices
offuel and other necessary raw materials neededfor the production ofpower.
Likelihood i Lebanon: Medium. For this project, fuel is by far the most important raw
material. Through a long-term fuel agreement, the project sponsor can assure that its price
will be predictable. Another alternative would be to index the power tariff to reflect
increases in the prices of fuel.
Cash Flow Risk. The risk of the cash flow deviating from predicted values.
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Likelihood in Lebanon: Low. The experienced sponsors would have thoroughly predicted
the cash flow. If satisfactory amounts of power are purchased and if the equipment
sustains the predicted efficiency, then cash flow problems are probably due to the
mismanagement of the O&M contractor. The latter is backed by a performance bond.
Cash flow problems could be insured, if this comforts the lenders. The Lebanese
government can guarantee the cash flow as an incentive to attract foreign investment.
Force Majeure Risk. This is the type of risk which results from events beyond the
control of any of the parties to the project financing. These events include various kinds
of insurable casualty losses, such as fire, flood and earthquake and non-casualty losses
front such causes as wal; civil disturbance, strikes, lockouts, nuclear explosion,
expropriation and political interference.
Likelihood in Lebanon: Varies. History has proven that natural disasters have a low
likelihood of occurring in Lebanon. The risk from such events is low. On the other hand,
war, civil disturbance and political interference are more probable. This type of risk is
usually not insurable at all, especially viewing Lebanon's track record. Commercial lenders
as well as export credit agencies will normally be reluctant to take force majeure risks in a
BOT context and will seek for the support of one or more of the parties involved. The
lenders' objective might be to shift the various force majeure risks to the sponsor, or to
the sponsor's suppliers and purchasers through contractual obligations or insurance
protection.
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J. Government Concessions and Incentives
Lebanon's current economic condition is not encouraging for foreign firms to
invest on a long-term basis. Due to the length of the concession period, the foreign
contractor is skeptical of the long-term stability of a country which just came out of a civil
war. The current economic situation in Lebanon is not very promising and a foreign
contractor will need many incentives to invest in Lebanon. The country is approached by
many general contractors ready to undertake the relatively short-term risks of
construction, but fewer firms are willing to undertake the financing of a BOT project.
There is a wide variety of incentives the government can provide. The amount of
available incentives provided is dependent on how much the government is willing to
sacrifice in revenues and take risks. The more the government shares the risks of a project
and forgives taxes, the more willing the foreign contractor to participate in BOT projects.
The government of Lebanon can learn from other countries, such as Pakistan and Turkey,
which were successful in attracting foreign investment through the use of many financial
and legal incentives. Although it might not be reasonable to compare countries with
different socioeconomic structures, other countries have used many incentives that are
applicable to Lebanon in 1994.
The first and most important incentive the Government of Lebanon could provide
is an internationally competitive rate for the purchase of electric power3. The more
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competitive the rate is, the shorter the concession period, and therefore the less risk the
contractor will take. When the overall risk is lower, the contractor is more willing to
invest. Furthermore, a competitive rate will leave the cash flow some financial buffer, in
case the project is not as profitable as expected.
The next incentive on the part of the Lebanese Government should be on the
project specifications 3. The government should set standards of output expected and
clarify the incentives it is willing to give. The government should not be specific on the
design of the plant, type of fuel used, construction method or management method. The
contractor should have the freedom to choose the design, and technology, provided it
meets output expected and environmental standards. Usually the contractor will optimize
the design - equipment combination and find the most synergetic combination. Also, the
government must not impose on designers to use specific type of equipment or restrict the
choice of contractors. The project should be undertaken on a turnkey basis, with the
sponsor choosing all the members of the consortium. Such practices will lower the cost of
the project and allow the contractor to draw on his experience. The government agency is
less likely to be as experienced as the construction consortium. Moreover, the government
should have the design approved by an international consultant or a multilateral agency in
order to assure its validity and suitability, especially in environmental matters, for
Lebanon.
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The Lebanese Government should use some of the reconstruction funds to set up
an energy fund that targets BOT projects3 . This fund must provide financing for part of
the debt and the equity for the project. The government involvement will not only
encourage the investor by providing financial support, but also assure him that the
government has a stake in the project and will ensure its proper operation.
Other financing incentives include a permission for the BOT power generation
company to issue corporate bonds and shares to be sold in Lebanon3. These can be traded
in the Beirut Stock Exchange, and the public will be allowed to participate in the project's
financing. The public cooperation will reduce any nationalization risks and comfort the
international lenders. Such permission to issue shares and bonds would be more desirable
if accompanied by a permission to foreign banks to underwrite the issue of shares and
bonds by the BOT sponsor. The sale of the stocks and bonds could be more encouraged if
an independent rating agency would be allowed to evaluate them and advise the public of
the risks and profitability of investing in the project.
Fiscal incentives are important in such BOT projects 3. The Lebanese Ministry of
Finance should exempt the project from corporate income tax. The import of plant and
equipment should be allowed without the payment of customs duties, sales tax, import fee
and other surcharges. The equity and dividends should have guaranteed repatriation, and
must be free of income or capital gains tax. The Central Bank of Lebanon should provide
foreign exchange risk insurance for an acceptable fee.
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The Government of Lebanon should provide guarantees for EDL's performance in
the power purchase agreement. Also, it should guarantee the performance of the fuel
supplier if the latter is a local enterprise. Other very attractive incentives include protection
against specific force majeure risks. Some expected incentives include government
protection against certain taxes and duties and an insurance of the convertibility of the
Lebanese Pound.
One important factor that could reduce the time spent on negotiations is to reduce
the number of government agencies the sponsors will have to interact with3. For such a
project, the BOT contractor would have to interact with EDL, the Ministry of Hydraulic
and Electrical Resources, and the agency responsible for negotiating the project. The
government could facilitate negotiations by providing a one window operation. All the
parties that the sponsor is supposed to interact with can send representatives to a common
agency. This newly created agency will represent all interaction on the part of the
Lebanese Government and Authorities. The contractor will have to negotiate with only
one Government agency instead of several, and therefore reduce the negotiation time - and
money.
Since one of the main hurdles for foreign investors is the lack of clarity of the host
country's incentives and expectations, few investors end up spending time and money
searching for information or starting negotiations from scratch. The Government of
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Lebanon must put together a package that will highlight the exact government
requirements and incentives for such projects. Once published, the investors will
understand the incentives offered in Lebanon for BOT projects and will have a basis on
which to start negotiations (see Marketing BOT Projects section).
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K. Technology Transfer
The construction and operation of the BOT plant in Lebanon can have a positive
externality: Technology Transfer. The foreign contractors will bring about a level of
technical and management expertise that is not available in Lebanon. Through involving
Lebanese engineers in the plant construction and maintenance, the government can take
advantage of the presence of foreign expertise in Lebanon to achieve the transfer of skills
to the Lebanese workforce.
In such a project, transfer of technology can occur with select value-added-
activities. The value chain of such a project comprises the following activities:
1. Feasibility study





7. Operation and maintenance
Figure 14 shows the value chain of the project in Lebanon. Some of the above value added
activities include skills that can be transferred to the Lebanese engineers. The activities
are: Feasibility study, design, cost estimation, construction, operations and maintenance.
The following paragraphs will depict how the Lebanese government and the project
company can facilitate technology transfer in each of the abovementioned activities.
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Feasibility Proposal to Design Cost Bidding Construc- Operation









In the feasibility study phase, the sponsor will assess the need for a plant, its cost,
revenues and potential cash flows. Based on the results of this study, the sponsor will
determine if such a project is attractive or not. There is potential for transfer of technology
in this phase. Usually, similar studies are undertaken by EDL before building new plants
and transmission networks. EDL staff could benefit from assisting the foreign planner and
learning from his expertise and efficiency. The Government of Lebanon should request the
presence of EDL planning engineers in the feasibility study for the new plant. The
engineers can learn and enhance EDL's planning.
The design phase includes the design of the plant, the fuel supply tanks, the
equipment and the physical facility. The department of civil works in EDL could benefit
from assisting the international designer in this process. In the future, EDL's design
capabilities could be improved. The Government of Lebanon should request the presence
of several EDL engineers during this phase. If this is enforced over several generations of
BOT projects, the department of civil works at EDL could reach world standards.
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Moreover, EDL would be more qualified in setting Terms Of Reference for future public
bid projects after improving its design department.
The construction phase is one in which the local engineers can benefit substantially
from the presence of international contractors. By encouraging joint ventures between the
foreign and local contractors, the latter could learn both technical and project management
skills needed to undertake such large projects. Also, local subcontractors could benefit
from interacting with international construction firms. The equipment supplier can also
train EDL staff in the installation of the generation equipment.
The operations and maintenance contractor could play a very important role in
technology transfer. The Lebanese Authorities must impose a condition on the O&M
contractor that he periodically train EDL staff. Every year the O&M contractor should
invite several EDL O&M engineers and train them for a certain period. By the end of the
concession period, most O&M staff at EDL would have experienced this training. The
result of this is the significant improvement in EDL's performance in power generation.
Another method to approach this technology transfer in the O&M is for the
Lebanese Government to impose employment conditions on the operations contractor. If
the O&M contractor is forced to maintain a certain percentage of the plant's staff to be
Lebanese, then technology transfer is bound to occur. The government can also require
the contractor to transfer all the O&M to Lebanese staff several years before the end of
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the concession period. This requirement will force the O&M contractor to train its
Lebanese employees since he will be responsible for their performance during the last few
years of the concession period. After the transfer, the government will keep all the staff
and ensure that the performance of the plant will not change once the O&M contractor's
contract ends.
The government must take advantage of the positive externality of technology
transfer and turn the BOT project into a BOOTT (Build-Own-Operate-Train-Transfer).
The process will be much more systematic and better enforced if the Lebanese
Government sets up an agency to monitor, negotiate and encourage technology transfer.
203
L. Transfer of Plant Ownership to Ministry of Hydraulic and
Electrical Resources
A typical BOT project requires that ownership be transferred to the host
government at the end of the concession period. The transfer includes the ownership of
land, plant and equipment. In some BOT agreements, the land remains owned by the
government and leased to the sponsor.
At the end of the concession period, the Lebanese Government will have two
alternatives with the ownership of the plant 2. The first would be adding the plant to
EDL's assets, and allowing the latter to manage it. The other alternative would be to lease
the plant to the project company if the latter is interested in undertaking the management
for a longer period than the originally planned concession. The transfer will not require
any payment from either the government or the project company unless otherwise
specified in the agreement. In some cases, the equity investors require some financial
compensations from the host government at the time of the transfer. This is especially true
if the plant is still in a good running condition and if the equity investors did not profit as
much as they originally planned. It is advisable that at the time of transfer the Government
of Lebanon offers a bonus to the project company if the plant is well maintained and
returned in a good condition.
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The plant should be inspected either by EDL's specialized staff or by an
international consultant at the time of the transfer in order to accurately assess the
condition of the plant. The sponsor is required to hand over the plant to EDL completely
maintained and ready in every respect for continuous operation at the normal production
rate. The contractor shall submit all technical instructions, operations and maintenance
manuals, as built drawings, and the full list of all spare parts required for operating the
plant for its remaining lifetime4.
In case the cash flow of the project deviates from its predicted value, the transfer
period could be changed to accommodate for that deviation. If the plant repays its debt
ahead of time, the transfer period could be made earlier. On the other hand, if the revenues
are less than expected for reasons beyond the control of the sponsors, the transfer period
could be delayed to compensate for the deficit. Such flexibility on the part of the
government could be a good incentive for international contractors to invest in Lebanon.
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M. Marketing BOT Projects in Lebanon15
The concept of BOT financing is relatively new to the Middle Eastern region. It
has been widely undertaken in Turkey under Ozal's regime, and is one of the vehicles the
country used to finance its infrastructure. However, Arab countries have not yet
implemented BOT on a large scale. This is due to several factors: Some Arab countries
(such as the Gulf countries) did not need financial assistance from the private sector and
others were politically unstable and could not attract foreign investments.
Lebanon's reconstruction gives both its government and foreign investors an
opportunity to start using limited recourse financing in this country. Consequently, the
government should start promoting the concept to both the Lebanese public and to the
potential investors. Such marketing will communicate the benefits of BOT type projects
and initiate the interest of the foreign investors and the political support of the Lebanese
business community, the governmental agencies and regulators.
The next paragraphs will describe the steps the Government of Lebanon should
follow in order to market the BOT implementation of this specific power generation plant
and future infrastructure projects. There are two target audiences for this marketing: the
local audience and the international audience. The local audience consists of local lenders
such as commercial banks, wealthy individuals (which are prospective investors) and
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financing institutions. Once briefed on the advantages of BOT projects, the latter will be
more willing to participate in financing such projects. EDL must also be included in the
local audience in order to promote its cooperation with the generation plant. The
international audience includes the potential sponsors, contractors and lending agencies
which will bring both money and expertise, two factors on which the project is dependent.
In order to promote the project locally, the marketing campaign should focus on
educating the audience of the benefits of a BOT project. The following points should be
communicated:
* BOT arrangements rely on the synergy between the partnership of public and private
sectors. The public sector is called on selecting what infrastructure projects are most
needed while the private sector is relied upon for building the facility and operating it.
* BOT arrangements are beneficial to the government, the public and the project
company. The advantage of using a private contractor over a public one is that the
former is more efficient and more skilled. This gain in efficiency is shared between the
project company, in terms of profit, and the public, in terms of better quality facilities.
* BOT arrangements free some of the government's crucial resources since the main
investment is made by the non-government sector. Therefore, the government will
have more available resources to channel into different priorities such as education and
reduction of poverty.
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· One of the most critical aspects of a BOT project in Lebanon is the "T" (transfer).
After a certain duration the government will inherit an infrastructure project at no cost.
In this case, it consists of a technologically advanced plant and its trained staff.
* The procurement process will be fair to all the contractors interested in bidding for the
project. All contractors should be guaranteed a fair evaluation of their bid.
* There is a shortage of power in Lebanon. The BOT project will help alleviate this
problem. This approach is mainly aimed at the general public which is ailing from the
power shortage problem. This fact will assure the potential investors of the demand for
the plant's product.
As for the foreign investors, the marketing campaign should be able to explain why
this specific project should be undertaken as a BOT and not through the public sector.
They must be assured of the seriousness of the Lebanese Government's commitment to
the project and of the long-term stability of the country. One important point to note is
that the Government of Lebanon will be competing with other governments in tying to
lure investors to come to Lebanon. The investors must be assured of the predictability of
events in the country, especially ones that would negatively affect the project's cash flow.
Finally, they must believe that the government is entirely committed to the project and will
guarantee some of the country risks.
There are a number of different elements that a marketing campaign should
incorporate in order to effectively promote the project internationally. When conducting
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its marketing campaign, the Government of Lebanon should consider the following
constituents:
* Investor Search. The campaign must approach potential investors, preferably ones
which previously participated in energy BOT projects in developing countries. These
investors will most likely fulfill the prequalification standards for the project.
* Advertisements. The campaign must place advertisements in international
newspapers, trade journals and investment publications. There must be an efficient follow
up to these advertisements. The campaign must have informative literature on the project
in case more detailed information is requested.
· Information Packet. Such a package must be compiled and ready to send to the
requesters of information. The package should include the specifications of the facility to
be franchised, a description of incentives provided by the Government of Lebanon and the
name of a contact person one can call to obtain more information.
· Delegation Tour. The Council of Development and Reconstruction should invite the
prospective investors to Lebanon. These must be greeted by prominent government
officials who will accompany them to the proposed site and persuade them that Lebanon is
politically stable, and serious about rebuilding its economy. The event can be covered by
the media in order to show the strong government support to the project.
· Project Briefings. The Government Authorities must have information sessions open
to the public. These sessions should be regularly scheduled to answer questions investors
might have, and any concerns the general public may have.
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* Contact Person. Since the Lebanese Government tends to be bureaucratic, it is
essential to assign a single authority/individual for the dissemination of information on the
project. It would then be the individual's responsibility to collect all the relevant
information on the project in order to accurately answer questions raised.
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This thesis describes the general framework for BOT-type projects and attempts to
personalize this process to the case of Lebanon. BOT-type projects have been
implemented in many developing countries with different economic structures, ranging
from Pakistan to Turkey. The results of such ventures have sometimes been successful and
at other times less desirable. If implemented carefully, BOT projects will yield desirable
cashflows and generously repay all the involved investors. Such positive results will
enhance the interest of lenders in future projects in that country. On the other hand, an
unsuccessful project could not only be financially deficient, but would also discourage
potential investors from getting involved in projects in that country. The lessons learned
from past projects are well documented and should be carefully reviewed by the host
government before it attempts to negotiate legal and financial schemes for prospective
projects.
Since no project of this nature has been undertaken in Lebanon, the government is
inexperienced in such negotiations. Lebanon differs significantly from the other developing
countries studied (Turkey, Pakistan, and the Philippines) for the following reasons. The
first major difference is that Lebanon has just come out of a long and destructive civil war.
The second difference is Lebanon's severe currency devaluation in the mid 1980s and the
constant fluctuation of the value of the local currency. Thirdly, Lebanon remains politically
weak compared to its stronger neighbors. Finally, until the time this thesis was written, the
Lebanese Government had not publicly announced its willingness to adopt privatization
schemes for the reconstruction of its infrastructure. All these differences are hurdles to the
success of a public-private partnership in that country.
The thesis sheds light on the issues that need to be debated before such a project
can be implemented in Lebanon. Even though such a project appears to be viable in
theory, the authors are certain that it would require a great effort in order to be
successfully implemented in a country with a similar socioeconomic structure and history
as Lebanon. Although BOT projects have many advantages, they do not present a perfect
solution for developing countries. The advantages of BOT projects are':
· Additionality. BOT projects are ideal in cases where the host government has neither
the finance nor the borrowing capacity to undertake an infrastructure project.
Additional financing is provided by the international lenders participating in the
project. Governments which promote BOT projects use additionality as the main
reason for their interest.
* Credibility. Since the private sector is usually more qualified than the public sector in
evaluating whether and how a particular project should be built, lenders are more
willing to take on the risk associated with a BOT project. The BOT approach saves
developing countries from non-viable projects which might otherwise be carried out as
public sector projects.
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* Efficiency. The private sector is usually more efficient than the public sector,
especially in developing countries.
· Benchmarking. The private sector project can be used to measure the efficiency of
similar public sector projects in the host country.
* Technology Transfer. BOT projects should include training programs which transfer
technical and managerial skills to the local staff. Although technology transfer could
occur without a BOT project, the latter facilitates the process.
Nevertheless, BOT projects have the following disadvantages':
· Complication. BOT projects involve highly complicated negotiations. The time and
money spent on finalizing agreements involve a high opportunity cost.
· Financial Constraints. Commercial lenders and export credit agencies are sometimes
limited by the country risks, even if the BOT approach is used.
* Cost. A public sector project, if implemented efficiently, will cost the host government
less than the overall cost of a BOT project. This is due to the time saved on
negotiations and the money saved from risk covering and guarantees.
While Lebanon is currently not a desirable country in which to undertake BOT
projects, serious government participation can make the country more attractive to
investors. The lessons learned from other countries suggest that government participation
is crucial in both the negotiation and implementation stages. If the Lebanese Government
actively markets BOT projects, and offers a package of incentives to show its commitment
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to public-private partnerships, Lebanon will become substantially more attractive to
international lenders. The government must insure the success of the first BOT project
implemented in that country since such positive results will trigger a new generation of
BOT projects that could rebuild a significant portion of the country's infrastructure.
This thesis constitutes the first step in understanding the issues needed to
implement BOT in Lebanon. If the government desires to promote such schemes in the
country, a more quantitative report must be produced to prove the viability of the project,
given the incentives the Lebanese Authorities are willing to provide the international
investors with. Further research should explore the viability of BOT projects applied to
other sectors of Lebanon's infrastructure.
Given the limited information used to write this thesis, the authors feel that no
concrete conclusions can be drawn from the Lebanese Power Generation case.
Nevertheless, the qualitative nature of this thesis could serve to introduce the notion of
public-private partnership to the Government of Lebanon. The authors hope that this work
would be taken into consideration by the authorities involved in planning the
reconstruction of Lebanon.
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Relevant Facts About Lebanon
Source: Boustani, Sami "Privatization and Its Role m the Reconstruction of Lebanon" MIT Thesis 1992.
Lebanon Facts and Figures
Area: 10,452 Square Kilometers (4,015 Square Miles)
Population: 2,655,000 in 1990
Capital and Largest City: Beirut
Other Major Cities: Tripoli, Saida, Tyr, Zahleh, and Baalbeck.
Population of Beirut Metropolitan Area: 1,250,000 million in 1990
Political System: Democratic, Parliamentary
Economic System: Liberal, "Laissez-faire"
National Currency: Lebanese Pound (L.L.)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 1990: U.S.$ 2.137 billion
1991: About U.S. 2.80 billion
Exchange Rate on April 15, 1992: 1410 L.L. for one U.S. dollar
Boundaries: North and East: Syria
West: Mediterranean Sea
South: Israel
Principal Activities: Commerce, Banking, and Services
Languages: Arabic, French, and English
Major Universities: * American University of Beirut (AUB)
* "Universit6 Saint-Joseph" (USJ)
* "Universit6 Libanaise" (UL)
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Lebanon, Forth Quarter 1993 London 1993
Economic structure
Latest asllable Ptares
Economic Indicators 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
CDP at crrent .rrces' S - 3 274 2 606 2.558 2.941 3,165
Consumer oDrlce rlation '50 50 1 S 33 130
Population m 2 66 2 67 2 70 2 74 2 70
EDonRs fot S m 629 485 494 539 560
:,rports of S "n 2,366 2.235 2.525 3.743 4,203
Reserves excl gold S m 978 938 660 1.276 1.496b
Totai external deOt S bn I 1 2 2 0 1 9 2 0
Excljange rate (av) E 1$ 409 2 496 7 695 1 928 2 1,713 0"
October 4, 1993 L1.,711 Si
Origins of gross domestic product 1987 we of total Components of gross domestic product 1967 % of total
Agnculture 8 7 Covemment consumption 5 7
Erergy & water 0 8 Pnvate consumption 96 5
Manufacturnrg 14 7 Cross capital formation 16 0
Construction 4 8 Net exports of goods 6t services -18 2
;nanc,al services 8 7 GDP at market prnie 100.0
Non-firarcat services 22 9
Commerce 34 2
Aoministration 5 2
CDP at market prices 100.0
Principal exports 1992 S m Principal Imports 1982 S m
C'othlng 1 0 Consumergoods 1,331
vetals & metal products 64 Machinery & transport ecaupment 1,165
:ood proclucts 55 Petroleum products 665
Total Incl others 510 Total Ind others 3,327
Main destinations of exports 1991 we of total Main origins of Imports 1991 of total
Saudi Arabla 21 8 Italy 13 6
'AE 106 Syna 11 4
Swtueand 8 0 USA 8 1
lordan 7 2 France 81
France 5 2 Cermanyd 6 7
* EIU estimates End-December national figure 'National source. lIncludes former East CGemnany.
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Lebanon, Fourth Quarter 1993 London 1993.
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Lebanon, Fourth Quarter 1993 London 1993
Lebanon: comparative economic Indicators
Military expenditure per head Merchandise trade balance
S Sm
S- SIM r-|z- *(M Dwvrr( tto. I r W d 0Srs IU 1snis-- - f- Sa
ODA per head (a) Total external debt per hea
S S
o
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Available Foreign Financing in Lebanon
Source: Iskandar, Marwan "The Lebanese Economy in 1993" Banque de La Mediteranee, March 1994
$ million
ector AFESD SFD KFAED ADFAED IDB IBRD CEC/EIB France Italy Others Total
lectricity 73.7 31.2 - - 35.0 50.5 19.7 261.8 - 471.9
aste Water . 16.2 3.6 - 9.0 0.7 29.5
olid Waste . 30.0 - - 23.6 - 53.6
elecom- -34.5 - 12.6 - - 7.6 32.0 86.7
unications
ransport 64.5 - - - 50.5 0.8 25.3 1.8 142.9
ater Supply - 16.7 - 43.8 14.4 26.4 14.0 0.6 115.9
ducation - 21.7 6.3 13.3 15.0 9.0 1.6 5.7 17.5 90.1
ublic Health - 33.1 10.7 - - 8.7 19.2 71.7
ousing/ 26.8 4.8 25.0 - 25.0 - - 5.3 86.9
Resettlement.
griculture/ .-.. . 5.5 20.6 26.1
rrigation
ndustr_ . . . .
il and Gas . . . 0.3 - 0.3 0.6
ervices and -- - -
ourism
Government 5.9 5.0 - - 2.9 13.8
Bldgs..
anagement . . . 10.5 43.5 - 2.9 2.8 59.7
nd Implem.
llocated 100.5 130.0 88.7 30.0 36.9 175.5 171.5 56.4 388.5 71.4 1249.4
unds
nallocated - 100.0 25.0 - - - 95.1 - 5.0 26.6 251.7
unds
otal Funds 100.5 230.0 113.7 30.0 36.9 175.5 266.6 56.4 393.5 98 1501.1
Legend:
AFESD: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
SFD: Saudi Fund for Development.
KFAED: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.
ADFAED: Abu-Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development.
IDB: Islamic Development Bank.
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).
CEC/EIB: Commission of the European Community/European Investment Bank.
Others include: UN; UNDP; FAO; IFAD; OPECF; Belgium; Germany; Japan; Oman;
Qatar; Syria; USA.
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